tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post8653305176797857588..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Tendentious Terminology in EthicsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-46796766461360938712021-09-03T18:03:13.989-04:002021-09-03T18:03:13.989-04:00the separateness of persons objection seems like t...the separateness of persons objection seems like the type of things educated/interested folks not steeped in utilitarian/ethical theory might throw out as an objection. In that case I don't know that it is so objectionable, as they might not be in a position to notice the distinction you make, and are likely raising it in a context where that level of attention to nuance is not expected. e.g. I don't expect the educated lay public to be attentive to the nuances of scientific discussion and it doesn't seem fair to impose that expectation outside of a setting like a scientific journal. I suspect that's not your target here, but I thought I'd throw out that potential qualification.<br /><br />Trying to think of an alternative explanation for what they might be trying to get at, I'm curious if anyone's argued for what I'll call a separateness of consequences type objection? I'm thinking that, if a person commits a wrong act at t0, and then many/a greater good act at t1, I don't think many would agree the later good act makes the earlier wrong act no longer wrong. There is a disanalogy I think in the sense that the act at t0 isn't necessarily/causally related to the good act at t1, but I think that gap could be filled, perhaps most simply by specifying that they intended to "make up for" the bad act at t0 with a later good act. I still don't think most would say the later good act make the earlier bad act permissible. But if we remove the time gap, don't we end up with a trolley like scenario? Maybe that's confused, and regardless I agree with your unearned rhetorical force conclusion.RChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08038859031547788616noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-21555764150564886082021-09-03T12:34:53.726-04:002021-09-03T12:34:53.726-04:00Hmm, maybe I'm off the mark on that. Will have...Hmm, maybe I'm off the mark on that. Will have to think more on that another time.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08407005231454153248noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-51114546729234259232021-09-03T10:34:46.920-04:002021-09-03T10:34:46.920-04:00What do you have in mind? One does not need to be...What do you have in mind? One does not need to be "conservative" in order to value persons separately. But see also my old post on <a href="https://www.philosophyetc.net/2012/10/competing-claims-and-separate-persons.html" rel="nofollow">Competing Claims and Separate Persons</a> which touches on the non-identity problem.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-44582441235512156482021-09-03T10:28:49.592-04:002021-09-03T10:28:49.592-04:00Agreed, "the sadistic conclusion" is an ...Agreed, "the sadistic conclusion" is an extremely misleading label.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-45975590206086596862021-09-03T09:46:33.501-04:002021-09-03T09:46:33.501-04:00Despite your previous linked post, I don't thi...Despite your previous linked post, I don't think you have really give a theory of pop ethics.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08407005231454153248noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-50977612943203013052021-09-03T09:45:38.647-04:002021-09-03T09:45:38.647-04:00I think your claims on the separateness of persons...I think your claims on the separateness of persons may be strengthened if you can deliver a "conservative" utilitarian account of 1) population ethics and 2) weird personal identity cases. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08407005231454153248noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-52469215218126420992021-09-03T00:35:37.152-04:002021-09-03T00:35:37.152-04:00I dislike the phrase "Sadistic Conclusion&quo...I dislike the phrase "Sadistic Conclusion" in population ethics. The term "Sadistic" means that you regard pain and suffering as a good and desirable thing. But the Sadistic Conclusion does not imply that adding negative welfare lives is a good thing. It merely implies that it can sometimes be a "less bad" thing then adding a very large quantity of extremely low, but positive welfare lives. To someone who accepts the Sadistic Conclusion, sometimes adding negative welfare lives is less horrible than the alternative, but it is still horrible. If there was a way to avoid the alternative without adding negative welfare lives, they would jump at the chance, because they are not sadists, and it is hugely misleading to imply that they are.<br /><br />All the Sadistic Conclusion is saying is that, if the addition of low-welfare but positive lives can occasionally be bad, that implies it is sometimes less bad to do some other bad thing in order to prevent it. If you regard different bad things as commensurate, and capable of being traded off against each other, that is only logical. Acting like one special instance of this general principle is some kind of horrible conclusion that implies sadism on the part of its adherents is baffling. Again, if you accept the Sadistic Conclusion you still think adding negative lives is bad, so it is unfair to call people who accept it sadists! I've also argued before that ordinary people seem to act like they accept the Sadistic Conclusion in their day to day lives, since they are willing incur costs to reduce the amount of children that are born.<br /><br />I personally think that framing this principle as some unacceptable "Sadistic Conclusion" has seriously harmed the field of population ethics. It has led ethicists to think that this conclusion is so unacceptable that it is impossible to find an acceptable population ethics. Even worse, it has led people to accept the Repugnant Conclusion and Total Utilitarianism, even though I think those are much worse, and much more counter to the human race's implicit population ethics that ethicists are trying to formalize.Evanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15661002375460378958noreply@blogger.com