tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post7522834448215556707..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Only Action is PracticalRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-49763792627452284112009-01-17T20:02:00.000-05:002009-01-17T20:02:00.000-05:00I should add that I agree with your comments about...I should add that I agree with your comments about sequences of actions being of relatively little importance. This is why I'm an actualist rather than a possibilist. In fact, we seem to agree on most ethical points, the major divergence being axiology where I find a form of aggregative hedonistic view most plausible -- I'm following your holistic view with interest though.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-7308868967686362272009-01-17T19:58:00.000-05:002009-01-17T19:58:00.000-05:00I think that:'How should I decide what to do?'and'...I think that:<BR/><BR/>'How should I decide what to do?'<BR/><BR/>and<BR/><BR/>'How should I be motivated?'<BR/><BR/>are also very important questions, and ones that most consequentialists don't give enough time to. We are rightly criticized by deontologists and virtue ethicists for this. <BR/><BR/>In particular, after seeing that the appropriate consequentialist answer to the first of these is something like 'by whichever decision procedure leads to the best consequences', we can see that when we deliberate, it shouldn't be in terms of trying to work out which act is right, and thus the question 'What should I do?' is perhaps best to never be asked. This somewhat deflates its practical importance (at least when the question is interpreted in the standard consequentialist way in terms of producing optimal outcomes, rather than the following of the optimal decision procedure).<BR/><BR/>I'm looking at such things in my thesis.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com