tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-91793256004770201262007-11-19T16:06:00.000-05:002007-11-19T16:06:00.000-05:001) Claims about whether M disag. would disappear upon agreement on non-moral facts do NOT boil down to the (non-empirical) question whether the non-moral facts entail determinate moral conclusions. Most philosophers don't believe that if there is moral truth it is entailed by non-moral facts. The question many of us interested in moral disagreement have in mind concerns the moral beliefs people would actually hold if they were better informed.<BR/><BR/>The idea, as I tried to suggest, has to do with epistemic access to the supposed moral truth. By analogy, suppose I claim that we have a faculty of vision, which enables to tell us about nearby objects. It would be an embarrassment to such a(n obviously true) "theory" if people looking at the very same things reported wildly different "visual experiences". But if these differences could be explained as owing to, for example, differences of perspective, then the embarrassment would disappear.<BR/><BR/>The argument gets pretty complicated, depending on the sort of access hypothesized, and non-moral beliefs are only part of the story. But entailment of the moral by the non-moral is not standardly thought relevant.<BR/><BR/>2) On your point about being interested in free will (the concept you already have a grasp on) as opposed to what other people refer to when they use the concept, I'm not fully getting your position, though I've heard people say similar things. Presumably you are not just looking to understand a concept that appears only in your personal idiolect, but a shared one. Suppose I (as a philosopher) want to understand the concept of moral rightness, which (cont'd)Don Loebnoreply@blogger.com