tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-54085557363734306672007-11-21T23:38:00.000-05:002007-11-21T23:38:00.000-05:00Hi Don, thanks for your reply, and for the reference (which I will need to chase up). Let me clarify my take on the two points in question:<BR/><BR/>(1) I don't think we have any special "faculty" of moral intuition. All we have is the general faculty of reason. So, on my view, if the moral facts are <B>not</B> <I>a priori</I> entailed by the non-moral facts, then they can't be known at all, and so we (in our ignorance) are condemned to persisting disagreement. Conversely, if the moral facts <B>are</B> entailed by the non-moral facts, then obviously disagreement will not persist upon idealization.<BR/><BR/>(2) I really do just care about my personal idiolect.<BR/><BR/>Note that even a utilitarian should - reflecting on Moore's open question argument - recognize some <A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2007/01/is-normativity-just-semantics.html" REL="nofollow">irreducibly normative</A> moral concept (it doesn't matter whether they or others call it "rightness") distinct from that of "utility maximizing", even if they turn out to denote the same property.<BR/><BR/><I>This</I> concept I've just described - the irreducibly normative one, which <I>just so happens</I> to be commonly called "rightness" - is certainly well worth understanding. But why would you care about "whatever other people mean by 'rightness'", under this peculiar description? You should care about <I>rightness</I>, the concept itself, and not under the guise of the mere word.Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.com