tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post5841244894994077853..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Rational RecoveryRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-11084939159700761152008-04-12T13:10:00.000-04:002008-04-12T13:10:00.000-04:00Barry - yeah, I like your first point. On the seco...Barry - yeah, I like your first point. On the second, a mere constraint is technically consistent with any other constraints whatsoever. It's just that we risk ending up with a set of constraints that cannot possibly all be satisfied at once. So I take it you're really asking what other rational constraints are <I>co-satisfiable</I> with EWV. I guess we can rule out any constraint which asks us not to ever depart from what our first-order evidence supports. But other than that, I'm not sure...Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-17454798674538886392008-04-12T07:30:00.000-04:002008-04-12T07:30:00.000-04:00Strategies for recovering from rational errors? Co...Strategies for recovering from rational errors? Common sense springs to mind, fuzzy as it is, and such applications of it as the actual practices of practiciing scientists; so maybe those studying the latter would have some ideas, but I don't really know. Self-criticism, imagination, objectivity and so forth? I'm reminded of how we can always resolve an apparent contradiction by discovering an equivocation (and so, for example, precisifying predicates). Maybe there can't be a theory of it until we know everything; which makes me a mysterian I guess. (Maybe teachers know about such things, in a practical way, and theorists of teaching know of such?) Your question is certainly the most important one in modern philosophy!Martin Cookehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11425491938517935179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-84038408762187850342008-04-12T00:30:00.000-04:002008-04-12T00:30:00.000-04:00Hi Richard,I agree with you that Adam's move (to E...Hi Richard,<BR/><BR/>I agree with you that Adam's move (to EWV as one constraint) is interesting. I haven't thought it through yet, but here's a couple of suggestions I would be keen to hear your thoughts about.<BR/><BR/>Firstly, a datum worth flagging, and which Adam agreed to in conversation, is that this move undermines the advantage of EWV as an internal decision making procedure. In conversation with people I usually find that the readiness of the prescription in difficult cases - "split the difference!" - butresses their belief in EWV. But of course this is no longer the case. Now we should only split the difference if various other conditions are satisfied. This may undermine EWV's intuitive appeal.<BR/><BR/>Second, I wonder what sort of other rational constraints EWV is consistent with. Obviously Adam has something or other Bayesian in mind. But, at a stretch, might this condition be consistent even with Williamson-style non-phenomenalism? <BR/><BR/>Sorry not to speak to your main point.<BR/><BR/>And thanks for the word on blogging!Barryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04774365728896536875noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-87326792013521760752008-04-11T08:15:00.000-04:002008-04-11T08:15:00.000-04:00If your initial state had no info whatsoever, sure...If your initial state had <I>no</I> info whatsoever, sure, you'd be a pretty sad state. But if you had just made some rationality errors you might treat yourself as a <A HREF="http://hanson.gmu.edu/disagree.pdf" REL="nofollow">Bayesian wannabe</A> and reason accordingly.Robin Hansonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18396528456436940972noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-64175919613721970762008-04-10T15:56:00.000-04:002008-04-10T15:56:00.000-04:00I tend to phrase this issue in the following way. ...I tend to phrase this issue in the following way. It's easy to prove that certain surface features emerge from perfect rationality, but that gives us only very weak evidence that by manipulating the surface features of our deliberative practice we will move closer to perfect rationality. Very frequently, when we display surface features that conflict with perfect rationality this may be as a result of crude hacks that prevent us from being exploitable by other equally crude hacks. Eliminate the ugly surface features and we are still irrational, but are also vulnerable to crude manipulations that wouldn't otherwise cause us trouble.Michael Vassarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14093368267892307038noreply@blogger.com