tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post5463333883161583823..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Subtracting PresuppositionsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-36869624244805946602008-04-01T13:40:00.000-04:002008-04-01T13:40:00.000-04:00Hi Richard,I'm not going to say much. Just want t...Hi Richard,<BR/><BR/>I'm not going to say much. Just want to say that your entry reminds me of Malapropism. Since I haven't read the preceding entry. I can't comment much. But I'm going to read it pretty soon anyways. Let's see if any thoughts come into mind. <BR/><BR/>Cheers!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-24267723129257902542008-03-31T22:55:00.000-04:002008-03-31T22:55:00.000-04:00That's really fabulous stuff. Curious how it woul...That's really fabulous stuff. Curious how it would work in, say, ethics. Suppose you subscribe to some kind of metaethical error theory. Uh, for example, suppose you think that all normative claims are false. <BR/> <BR/>Then you might evaluate "murder as wrong"-wrongness as true? <BR/><BR/>That example raises a worry, though. If all normative claims are false, and murderwrong-wrongness is (potentially) true, does that make murderwrong-wrongness something other than a normative claim? And if so, what? <BR/><BR/>(That might just be a problem with metaethical error theories, though, rather than with subtracting presuppositions?)Paul Gowderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12987034334075962676noreply@blogger.com