tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post5029279186140690971..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: The Mark of the InstrumentalRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-70483412488802197932009-09-01T10:04:07.076-04:002009-09-01T10:04:07.076-04:00Hi Alex, the claim that some (loving) relationship...Hi Alex, the claim that some (loving) relationships are good in their own right is precisely the view I'm defending here. So I'm having trouble wrapping my head around the objection that no, they're really just a means to loving relationships.<br /><br />But you're right that this isn't the only difference in the case. Post-replacement, you'd also have fewer true beliefs (holding all else equal), and your happiness would now rest on a falsehood. So we need to assess whether these other changes might suffice to explain the difference in value. <br /><br />It seems pretty implausible to think that relationships are primarily valuable as a means to true beliefs, so I think we can set that proposal aside. Your final proposal is more promising: perhaps what matters here is something more like <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/04/veridical-enjoyment.html" rel="nofollow">veridical happiness</a> or desire satisfaction?<br /><br />This is tricky. As I argue in my <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/08/acquired-non-instrumental-value.html" rel="nofollow">follow-up post</a>, it seems odd to treat the particular things we (non-instrumentally) want as mere <i>means</i> to general desire satisfaction. We wouldn't typically be willing to substitute them, e.g. for the equally intense veridical enjoyment (or satisfied desire) of counting blades of grass.<br /><br />So I think the general point stands; though you're right that the robospouse case in isolation doesn't strictly suffice to show it.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-58567503153317804072009-09-01T02:28:54.104-04:002009-09-01T02:28:54.104-04:00"suppose that one's spouse was long ago k..."suppose that one's spouse was long ago kidnapped and secretly replaced by a cleverly disguised robot. [...] all the instrumental benefits remain as before: each robospouse provides their human partner with happiness, and promotes their moral flourishing, etc."<br /><br />I didn't quite follow this. If my partner were replaced by a robot, I'd think there are many instrumental benefits I'd lose out on: a loving-relationship, true beliefs, happiness which isn't "fake", and so on. (Depending on your inclinations, add "desire satisfaction" to the list.) Am I missing something?Alex Gregoryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03836914221864280274noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-30349697449551685332009-08-23T00:43:27.431-04:002009-08-23T00:43:27.431-04:00Interesting post! Do you thoughts here also have t...Interesting post! Do you thoughts here also have to do (in the case of friendship) with the idea that there's something one can "get" out of friendship (in general) that one can't get from other things? (By putting it this way, I don't mean to suggest anything egoistic; this is just a quick way of putting it. I hope the point is clear enough.)<br /><br />Now, if someone were to say that the only thing that matters is happiness, one might say friendship is fungible. But that doesn't seem right to me; such a reduction seems to miss something, i.e. whatever it is about friendship which, for example, <i>uniquely</i> contributes to happiness, a good life, etc.Matthew Pianaltohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.com