tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post4853379919017272105..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Derivative ObjectionsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-3471741471414734232008-04-03T02:30:00.000-04:002008-04-03T02:30:00.000-04:00(that is, we gain insight on the problem of X)(that is, we gain insight on the problem of X)Paul Gowderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12987034334075962676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-82982678603670327772008-04-03T02:11:00.000-04:002008-04-03T02:11:00.000-04:00Let me try to be clearer. A paradox is a reason t...Let me try to be clearer. <BR/><BR/>A paradox is a reason to reject a concept. It might not bring us to reject the concept, because we might come to an all-things-considered judgment that the concept is worth keeping for other reasons. (Perhaps we can't do without it, or perhaps we think the paradox will be resolved in time.) But the paradox doubtless counts against the concept.<BR/><BR/>One sensible way to do philosophy would be to minimize the number of reasons we have to reject a given concept (if we accept the concept, of course). So if we analyze X in terms of Y, and we pick up a paradox, that's one more reason to reject X than we'd otherwise have if we analyzed X in terms of Z. All else being equal, we should prefer the analysis in terms of Z.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps preference isn't the right way to describe it though. Rather, it is philosophically useful be able to see that X can either be firm or shaky (by shaky I mean "accepted only tentatively, pending resolution of this damn paradox"), depending on whether it's analyzed in terms of Y or Z. But seeing that depends on recognizing that the paradox for Y also causes problems for things analyzed in terms of Y. <BR/><BR/>So we gain insight on the problem of Y by pointing to the derivative objection.Paul Gowderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12987034334075962676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-44089384955815551612008-04-02T20:55:00.000-04:002008-04-02T20:55:00.000-04:00Paul - I'm not sure what to make of that. I guess ...Paul - I'm not sure what to make of that. I guess "expanding the scope of a paradox" might be slightly unfortunate. So it might tip the balance towards an alternative analysis if all else were equal. But all else is rarely equal, so I'm doubtful that it will often be a significant consideration.<BR/><BR/>Ben - that's interesting. I think you're suggesting a new form of argument, actually. It's not that the analysis leads to unacceptable paradox. It's that the analysis implies a surprising result (the analysandum inherits a feature we would not expect it to have, from the analysans). But I don't think this has much independent weight. In particular, I don't think the analysis adds much (if any) <I>further</I> unacceptability to what's already there. It may simply highlight that we don't yet have an acceptable solution to the underlying paradox!Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-88927020985529334092008-03-30T21:28:00.000-04:002008-03-30T21:28:00.000-04:00Hey Richard,I propose a test for whether your line...Hey Richard,<BR/>I propose a test for whether your line of defense works. Suppose we solve the paradox of desire in some way, and suppose desire satisfactionism is true. Do we get any results that are unacceptable? I say probably yes. For example, suppose the solution to the paradox of desire inolves the claim that there cannot be a desire to have most of one's desires frustrated. If desire satisfactionism is true, then it follows that there cannot be a desire to have one's life go badly. But there can (I say).Ben Bradleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16973178528256936149noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-30534230734035516972008-03-30T20:15:00.000-04:002008-03-30T20:15:00.000-04:00Hmm... But is it bad to expand the scope of a para...Hmm... <BR/><BR/>But is it bad to expand the scope of a paradox? You might face an argument along the lines of the following: <BR/><BR/>Y carries a paradox P. P causes problems for Y, but, all things considered, we still ought to accept Y.<BR/><BR/>I have an analysis of X in which X isn't threatened by P. <BR/><BR/>Your analysis of X in terms of Y means X is threatened by P.<BR/><BR/>An analysis in which only Y is threatened by P is better than an analysis in which X and Y are threatened by P. <BR/><BR/>Ergo, we should choose my analysis of X.Paul Gowderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12987034334075962676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-54916234951604940172008-03-30T17:14:00.000-04:002008-03-30T17:14:00.000-04:00That would be a fine objection. I'm instead talkin...That would be a fine objection. I'm instead talking about those who don't want to reject Y.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-56548977271550565422008-03-30T17:01:00.000-04:002008-03-30T17:01:00.000-04:00I would have thought that the charitable interpret...I would have thought that the charitable interpretation of this kind of objection was something like this: don't try to analyze X in terms of Y, because Y is a confused concept.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05260245860017778409noreply@blogger.com