tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post4338489653397919397..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: The Best Case for UncertaintismRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-62710135775700216552013-10-15T19:58:34.127-04:002013-10-15T19:58:34.127-04:00I claim that the norms that we most fundamentally ...I claim that the norms that we most fundamentally use to guide our behavior under uncertainty are not credence-relative norms, but are, rather, minimal-probability-relative norms. MP-relative norms are relative to MP's, not to our judgments about MP's. And claims about MP's express, rather than report, our credences, and their semantic features are to be explained by the credences they express. It is perfectly coherent to say "The minimal probability that Ayn Rand's moral theory is right is very low, even though Leonard has a very high credence in it", for JUST THE REASON that it's coherent to say "P, but Leonard believes not-P." This is all to say MP's are mind-independent in the relevant senses, and norms about what to do given the MP's of normative propositions are utterly insensitive to whatever credences various people happen to have. Similarly, I think anyone who has credences and expresses them either to herself or others has made MP-claims, just as anyone who has a belief in P and expresses it to herself or others has made "P"-claims.<br /><br />Now, does MP-relative normativity have anything to do with blame? I don't know, and to be honest, I don't so much care. But it has everything to do with the guidance of action, and since it's not belief-relative or credence-relative in some *allegedly* unseemly way, why not think that there are genuine facts about what you MP-relative ought to do.<br /><br />(This is a quick summary of stuff that's been developed at greater length in my 2013 Nous paper, my 2012 OSNE paper, and a forthcoming article on Subjective and Objective Reasons in the Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity.)<br /><br />But back to my example -- what's supposed to be the problem again?Andrew Sepiellinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-9273659259006484402013-10-15T12:53:23.766-04:002013-10-15T12:53:23.766-04:00Though the example of philosophical argument is a ...Though the example of philosophical argument is a nice one for bringing out the intuitive force of the idea that we really should (for some normatively significant sense of "should") have non-extreme credences about all sorts of a priori matters.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-55229101458353662862013-10-15T12:45:25.089-04:002013-10-15T12:45:25.089-04:00Hi Andrew, could you say a little more about how y...Hi Andrew, could you say a little more about how you see the shift to "minimal probability" talk helping here? Unless our MP-judgments are <i>justified</i> then I don't see them as having much normative interest (they won't excuse objective wrongdoing, etc.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-90165284114776117672013-10-15T12:29:15.878-04:002013-10-15T12:29:15.878-04:00[Andrew Sepielli writes:]
Does the move I make fr...[Andrew Sepielli writes:]<br /><br />Does the move I make from subjective-probability-relative to minimal-probability-relative norms help here? If not, why not?<br /><br />Relatedly, an example: it strikes me as very plausible that the probability (minimal, or epistemic on the expressivist construals of epistemic probability) of consequentialism is higher conditional on Jonathan Bennett's theory of acts and omissions being true than on that theory's being false. That is why, IF you accept Bennett's theory, it is a perfectly reasonable thing to do to increase your confidence in consequentialism -- which is, of course, what he wants you to do. That's why he wrote up his argument. What's wrong with that? My suspicion is that any answer is going to be grounded in considerations that in fact support the view, defended by Clayton Littlejohn (and maybe others -- I don't know this literature), that there are no false justified beliefs of any sort. But again, I'm open to hearing the other side.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com