tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post3125621312958382425..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Desiring Each GoodRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-55792669953103042202010-02-03T21:06:45.255-05:002010-02-03T21:06:45.255-05:00Hi Richard. Thanks for the clarification. To be ...Hi Richard. Thanks for the clarification. To be honest, I'm not so sure there is a standard interpretation of the 'value receptacle' objection, so I may well have interpreted your use of that term uncharitably. (In <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/08/equal-vs-identical-value.html?showComment=1251744329374#c8905449014642493166" rel="nofollow">this comment</a> I draw a distinction between two forms of utilitarianism which seems related to the "couple of different objections" you mention above. These are (I take it) that utilitarianism treats people as mere receptacles, and that it treats people as fungible or replaceable.Pablohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10363127923767597327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-49856822738565252752010-02-03T20:41:01.843-05:002010-02-03T20:41:01.843-05:00Hi Pablo, there are a couple of different objectio...Hi Pablo, there are a couple of different objections in this vicinity. Here I'm focusing on the objection that utilitarians treat people as <i>fungible</i>. (I agree with your response to the distinct objection that utilitarians value experiences rather than people. Perhaps I shouldn't have invoked the term 'receptacle', if it's generally interpreted in the way you describe.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-53118262079695755922010-02-03T19:28:43.112-05:002010-02-03T19:28:43.112-05:00I don't quite understand your reply to the ...I don't quite understand your reply to the 'value receptable' objection. According to this objection, utilitarianism fails because it attaches value to the experiences* of a person rather than to the person herself; the person is, on this view, only valued as a container of her experiences. In assessing the force of this objection, it seems to me irrelevant whether utilitarian agents have just one single desire to maximize good experiences or a multiplicity of desires corresponding to each of the good experiences to be maximized. In either case, the desire is not ultimately aimed at the person, but only at her experiences, whether individually or as constitutive parts of aggregate good.<br /><br />Those who are troubled by this objection should reply instead that what utilitarians value is not experiences, but people's lives. It's just that the value of a person's life is, for a utilitarian, a function of the quality of her experiences. But if each of these experiences occurred in isolation from all others in such a way that none could be properly ascribed to any individual person, the experiences would lack value, since they would have no impact on people's lives.<br /><br />--<br /><br />I assume, for simplicity, a hedonistic form of utilitarianism.Pablohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10363127923767597327noreply@blogger.com