tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post2513640877301416141..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Zombie ReviewRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger50125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-70195058318710624842008-04-27T14:41:00.000-04:002008-04-27T14:41:00.000-04:00But if _that_ were the reason for going reductivis...But if _that_ were the reason for going reductivist, it seems you're essentially moving the goalposts.Clayton Littlejohnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05596200828134402805noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-28510999288693492982008-04-26T16:37:00.000-04:002008-04-26T16:37:00.000-04:00Right, I'm a reductionist about identity for that ...Right, I'm a reductionist about identity for that reason, i.e. I <A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2006/07/essence-and-identity.html" REL="nofollow">don't think</A> that duplicate worlds (differing only in their identity facts) are really conceivable. See my posts under the sidebar category 'metaphysics - identity'.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-32433611579471627292008-04-26T16:27:00.000-04:002008-04-26T16:27:00.000-04:00Richard,You wrote: I certainly don't think it's ge...Richard,<BR/><BR/>You wrote: <BR/><I>I certainly don't think it's generally true that "the high level facts are known to us by acquaintance" only. I think the facts about tables, etc., are a priori entailed by microphysics. And it's not entirely clear to me why qualia should be any different.</I><BR/><BR/>I think that what the materialist will say is that if we have no reason to think that high-level facts in general will be apriori entailed by low-level facts, there's no reason to place much trust in certain kinds of modal intuitions. The proposal is not that it is a general feature of high-level of facts that they are typically known to us by acquaintance. Presumably the only things we'll know by acquaintance are things to which we have privileged access (e.g., beliefs, sensations, etc...). <BR/><BR/>I'm not sure what to make of your proposal about how we might still have to run the thought experiment once this wrinkle is introduced. I'll have to think it over. <BR/><BR/>There are other cases that I think pose a challenge to the project of cosmic hermeneutics that suggests that apriori connection is no test for necessity. Think about Chisholm's paradox. Don't facts about which persons exist in which worlds count as high-level facts that we cannot recover from descriptions of the low-level facts? It seems we might have two worlds indiscernible with respect to the basic physical facts but discernible with respect to the identity of the objects in that world. (Someone might take this to show that persons are ontologically special, but we can run the relevant thought experiments with ships, sticks of butter, pencils, etc...).Clayton Littlejohnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05596200828134402805noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-49588266220176371042008-04-26T13:48:00.000-04:002008-04-26T13:48:00.000-04:00Clayton - maybe something like that could help the...Clayton - maybe something like that could help the physicalist, though I'm not entirely sure I understand the proposal. I certainly don't think it's <I>generally</I> true that "<I>the high level facts are known to us by acquaintance</I>" only. I think the facts about tables, etc., are a priori entailed by microphysics. And it's not entirely clear to me why qualia should be any different. Perhaps one needs to have experienced <I>redness</I> in order to have the phenomenal concept, but <I>once you have the concept</I> (and note that we assume the idealized agent is granted full grasp of all relevant concepts) you can reason about it in descriptive terms. For example, if we include in the base facts the psycho-physical bridging laws that such-and-such physical arrangement gives rise to such-and-such qualia [insert image of phenomenal redness], then the ideal agent <I>can</I> infer from <I>this</I> base (and the physical facts) what qualia there are in the world. I'm not sure what reason we have to think that the bridging laws are unnecessary here. But maybe I'm just misunderstanding the proposal.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-60155224282755626962008-04-26T04:35:00.000-04:002008-04-26T04:35:00.000-04:00Scott:all of these "reams of literature" seem to c...Scott:<BR/><BR/>all of these "reams of literature" seem to come down to this single instinct that "subjective experience from objective matter" is weird. I have yet to see any argument which doesn't fundamentally rely on that point, which in itself is always unargued for. <BR/><BR/>The point I don't think you responded to was <BR/><BR/>"the best type of theory should be say simple, elegant, fit the results so far, and make predictions that we can test. A theory that wants to completely redefine our metaphysics should be especially so!<BR/><BR/>If the idea of a non physical qualia solved more than one metaphysical problem (and the idea of soul, for all you might say against it, at least did that), then it might be an intriguing idea.<BR/><BR/>At the moments its no more than an ad hoc add onto our normal picture of the world hurriedly crafted onto to solve one mystery, and that's why I think the burden of proof is massively with Richard."<BR/><BR/>If I don't understand lighting, sure I can just say Thor did it. Lighting looks like nothing else in the natural world. But I'd do a lot of a better to wait a thousand years for someone to describe electricity, a universal phenomenon which describes many, many other problems and has testable predictions.<BR/><BR/>As I've said previously, most arguments come down to "subjectivity is weird, because its subjectivity", or "we've never solved anything like subjectivity before" to which I say duh. <BR/><BR/>Life was like nothing we'd never seen before. So was lighting. So is fire for that matter to go a long way back. <BR/><BR/>If you want to say that subjectivity is weirder than the above examples, then give me a reason why it is so, don't just state "because it's subjective."<BR/><BR/>If you can't, then sure you can hold onto your gut instinct that this time just is different - but I repeat you're not doing philosophy, you're making a statement of faith, and so I suppose there's no real point in us debating any further.Jonathanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02028612648881844683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-87140592542873327852008-04-26T00:25:00.000-04:002008-04-26T00:25:00.000-04:00Hey Richard,I'm still not sure what your response ...Hey Richard,<BR/><BR/>I'm still not sure what your response was to my response on behalf of the physicalist from before. If you get the chance, I'd like to know. I think this issue is interesting, but I'm just not yet convinced by these sorts of zombie arguments. <BR/><BR/>You asked what the physicalist can say to explain something like the unreliability of the relevant intuition. It went something like this: <BR/><BR/>If what we need to know to grasp concepts of phenomenal properties is in part indexical or demonstrative knowledge and there is no apriori connection between descriptive (non-indexical and non-demonstrative) knowledge and indexical/demonstrative knowledge, the inability to deduce, infer, or whatever the phenomenal from the rest is just no more reason to assert that the phenomenal properties can possibly come apart from the physical. I can't tell if you disagree about the relationship between descriptive knowledge and indexical/demonstrative knowledge or if you think we can have knowledge of the phenomenal and grasp of the relevant concepts without needing such indexical/demonstrative knowledge. So far as I can tell, this _is_ the story the physicalist will tell about the reliability of these modal intuitions. Non-indexical descriptive knowledge does not give us a reliable guide to determining what indexical or demonstrative knowledge there is or could be. The inability to describe the world's phenomenal profile given a complete description of the physical profile is no more surprising than, say, the inability to connect the 'here' and 'now' facts with facts stated in non-indexical terms.<BR/><BR/>A friend of mine is working out a view along these lines. It goes something like this. The base facts from which the further facts are supposed to be derived from knowledge by description, so to speak. The physicalist will say that the high level facts are known to us by acquaintance, things we know de re, what have you. There's no real way to draw rational connections that allow us to move from descriptive knowledge to knowledge of Russellian propositions (the objects of knowledge by acquaintance). That's why it's not surprising that we cannot read the qualia facts off of the physical facts. We cannot read any of the 'facts' known to us through acquaintance in this way. But, that does nothing to show that these facts are not necessitated by the lower level physical facts.Clayton Littlejohnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05596200828134402805noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-88075078807076242752008-04-25T17:34:00.000-04:002008-04-25T17:34:00.000-04:00Scott,Thanks for fleshing out your position a litt...Scott,<BR/>Thanks for fleshing out your position a little.<BR/><BR/>I was just about to suggest you might be heading towards McGinn's mysterianism. <BR/>Maybe we could propose "the solution is necessarily unknowable"? I am inclined towards that for this sort of qualia if qualia exist.<BR/><BR/>It seems to me that the problem remains where Chalmers's dualism, quantum mind hypotheses, et al add another level but don't 'explain' in the sense we want. I.e. we can still ask similar questions even after any of these solutions are proposed. this reminds me of the 'god did it' explanation which is followed by 'why?'. (That, in itself, doesn't mean that they aren't true of course.)<BR/><BR/>it seems a little like the old story of the earth resting on a tortoise<BR/><BR/>> Subjective experience from objective matter<BR/><BR/>I wonder if this comes down to the 'why am I not you' question.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-24433579347325263862008-04-25T16:20:00.000-04:002008-04-25T16:20:00.000-04:00Jonathan, Dennett is working out the implications ...Jonathan, <BR/><BR/>Dennett is working out the implications of the materialist viewpoint. That leads him to the denial of qualia. The denial of qualia is not an independent step--it's an outcome of the materialist view. At least, that's how I understand his argument.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps you're one of Chalmers's type-B reductionists instead, a la Searle. But that view doesn't strike me as particularly robust either, so I don't think it much affects what I've said. To wit, I think you'll hit an absurdity either way.<BR/><BR/>As to what beyond gut instinct it comes down to, we have reams of literature on philosophy of the mind, we have Kripkean analyses and thought experiments, we have proofs and premises, we have empirical implications and talk of supervenience, modal claims and more. Now, if you want to say that in the end that all comes down to gut instinct, well then, so does everything.<BR/><BR/><EM>But I just made a whole post about why materialism is by far the best bet, which I'm not sure you've replied to any of</EM><BR/><BR/>If you mean the penultimate comment of yours that I responded to, I'm afraid I don't see anything in it that suggests materialism is by far the best bet. There is the analogy with the elan vital, but that's not persuasive, and, at any rate, <A HREF="http://consc.net/papers/moving.html#2.1" REL="nofollow">has been addressed</A>.<BR/><BR/><EM>a) qualia exist<BR/>b) like everything else in our mind, they eminate from our brain<BR/>c) like everything else in the mind, we don't understand how yet<BR/><BR/>None of that is weird!</EM><BR/><BR/>B is pretty weird, in my view. Subjective experience from objective matter is quite the stretch--and if I didn't have personal experience with the phenomenon, I'd probably say implausible. <BR/><BR/>Now it may be that once we find out how it happens, once we crack your "c)", it won't seem so weird. But I could say the same thing about a dualist explanation.<BR/><BR/>So this is a wash.<BR/><BR/><BR/>Cheers Ben, <BR/><BR/>Yes, there are some who simply assert an identity between qualia and neural states and leave it at that. I disagree that that will ever be satisfying, because of course it's logically possible that the identity not hold, so there's something that needs to be explained. This differs from other ideas: we can't conceivably vary biological facts, for example, without varying the physical facts upon which they supervene. But we can easily do so with phenomenal facts.<BR/><BR/>But this is of course only Chalmers's argument, and there's not much point to me restating it.<BR/><BR/>As to the burden of possibility, I'm afraid we just disagree. If one can describe a scenario with no apparent contradictions, then that's enough prima facie evidence--for me--that the scenario is logically possible. YMMV.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07597410735412554920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-47712071935291058762008-04-25T15:47:00.000-04:002008-04-25T15:47:00.000-04:00Cheers Scott,It seems to me that the position of n...Cheers Scott,<BR/><BR/>It seems to me that the position of not knowing whether it is possible should be the default and anyone claiming to know whether or not it is possible should provide a strong argument. To me a physicalist description would be anything that can be expressed mathematically, so the dualist would be correct if the universe could never be fully described in this way. I find physicalism more convincing because I don't see any strong evidence against it and it has less ingredients than competing theories.<BR/><BR/>Although I think we'll probably never really understand how our consciousness arise out of maths, in the same way we will never understand why anything exists, I do think that as we better understand how the brain works we will start to associate the concept of a qualia with a physical property of the brain, because that will be a useful way of talking about it. If we find that certain of our own physical patterns are always associated with certain mental states, and we start to be able to physically measure the connections between sensations, our thoughts, feelings, actions and memories we won't think that some non-physical ingredient is necessary to explain the correspondence. We will simply default to the simplest satisfactory explanation as we typically do and should.benhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17349603983957093745noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-50792450702285950272008-04-25T15:09:00.000-04:002008-04-25T15:09:00.000-04:00Scott : Again, Dennett is implying more than a mat...Scott : <BR/><BR/>Again, Dennett is implying more than a materialist viewpoint - he's implying qualia don't exist full stop.<BR/><BR/>What does it come down to if not gut instinct then?<BR/><BR/>Fine, we don't absolutely know that the answer will be materialist in that it can't be proved a priori.<BR/><BR/>But I just made a whole post about why materialism is by far the best bet, which I'm not sure you've replied to any of - except to suggest that "every view is weird".<BR/><BR/>That's simply not true. <BR/><BR/>Here is my position :<BR/><BR/>a) qualia exist<BR/>b) like everything else in our mind, they eminate from our brain<BR/>c) like everything else in the mind, we don't understand how yet<BR/><BR/>None of that is weird!Jonathanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02028612648881844683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-44384938411221146902008-04-25T14:01:00.000-04:002008-04-25T14:01:00.000-04:00Jonathan, If we were just trading gut instincts, t...Jonathan, <BR/><BR/>If we were just trading gut instincts, then yes, that's not really philosophy. Thankfully, I never asserted that's all it comes to.<BR/><BR/><EM>I might add Dennett goes far further than me - he denies qualia altogether, which I agree is a similarly unreasonable position, drawing huge and paradigm changing conclusions from flimsy evidence, rather than just accepting "we don't know yet" (more in common with Chalmers than perhaps he'd like to admit).</EM><BR/><BR/>Chalmers proceeds from the idea that there is something to be explained, whereas Dennett denies the very thing under question (and admits the counterintuitiveness of his conclusions). To me, Chalmers is the more modest of the two.<BR/><BR/>I readily accept "we don't know yet" (a principle, by the way, that Chalmers and Dennett both embrace). But the debate here is between you, who seem to believe the answer is "we don't know yet, but the answer will be a materialist one" and me, whose answer is "we don't know yet, and we won't know if the answer will be a materialist one."<BR/><BR/>As to which view is weirder, every view is weird, and you seem to agree, as you part ways with Dennett. If that leaves us in the middle, with a wait and see attitude, then I can live with it, but there's no reason to presume materialism while waiting. E.g, Dennett has taken the challenge seriously, and pushed materialism to its limit--the result is an absurdity, as you admit. All the more reason to be skeptical of any who assert that materialism is of course true.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07597410735412554920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-31195920874654453572008-04-25T12:20:00.000-04:002008-04-25T12:20:00.000-04:00Scott :Well, first off, if we're just trading gut ...Scott :<BR/><BR/>Well, first off, if we're just trading gut instincts, then we can stop calling it philosophy I'd have thought :)<BR/><BR/>I might add Dennett goes far further than me - he denies qualia altogether, which I agree is a similarly unreasonable position, drawing huge and paradigm changing conclusions from flimsy evidence, rather than just accepting "we don't know yet" (more in common with Chalmers than perhaps he'd like to admit).<BR/><BR/>I'm surprised that you so easily seem to have been able to imagine a physical solution to life - it was after all a problem that has (and still does) lead many to feel materialism is inadequate and that a God or some spiritual realm is needed. <BR/><BR/>Neither do I see a ready answer in today's science to Why does anything exist rather than nothing? How does causation work? etc and other similar points about fundamental physics, which I have no idea how a 'functional' theory could explain. I guess that's why philosophers love talking about them too...<BR/><BR/>Richard seems to think that this weird picture of qualia floating on top of the normal physical universe is more reasonable than saying science just hasn't got there yet. You can disagree on that point, but I don't think you can say each side is equally valid - to be rough the best type of theory should be say simple, elegant, fit the results so far, and make predictions that we can test. A theory that wants to completely redefine our metaphysics should be especially so!<BR/><BR/>If the idea of a non physical qualia solved more than one metaphysical problem (and the idea of soul, for all you might say against it, at least did that), then it might be an intriguing idea.<BR/><BR/>At the moments its no more than an ad hoc add onto our normal picture of the world hurriedly crafted onto to solve one mystery, and that's why I think the burden of proof is massively with Richard.<BR/><BR/>Good to know that I think I've finally got a word description of the epiphenomalist picture of qualia. Been dwelling on it all day, and the more I think of it, the less sense this idea of disembodied qualia, experience without an experiencer makes to me, but there you go.Jonathanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02028612648881844683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-76430578323535340592008-04-25T11:10:00.000-04:002008-04-25T11:10:00.000-04:00Jonathan, But it doesn't seem at first glance (or ...Jonathan, <BR/><BR/><EM>But it doesn't seem at first glance (or even a priori) harder to me the problem of life does, or did.</EM><BR/><BR/>We have a different intuition then. I can imagine a functional analysis of many things--even things we don't yet have explanations for. I have no clue how subjectivity arises.<BR/><BR/><EM>At the moment their argument seems to come down to some sort of gut instinct "it just is different"</EM><BR/><BR/>I agree that much of it comes down to this, but I don't see that cutting one way or another. Dennett's got a gut instinct for materialism. Many a dualist has a different one. Okey doke. Now what?<BR/><BR/>Your description of Richard's position on the causal chain of qualia seems apt.<BR/><BR/>Genius,<BR/><BR/><EM>So what sort of explanation is it? What form of answer would a physical explanation that satisfied you take?</EM><BR/><BR/>If I could tell you the form of the explanation, we wouldn't have a problem. But I can't imagine the form such an explanation could take. Hence, I'm skeptical of a forthcoming physical explanation. If your point is I'm asking for a different explanation than is typical, I readily agree, and the reason is because we're dealing with a different phenomenon than is usually dealt with, which was of course my original point: that consciousness is different.<BR/><BR/><EM>For that matter - what form of non physical explination would satisfy you?</EM><BR/><BR/>Several dualist theories strike me as promising. Chalmers's dualism, quantum mind hypotheses, et al, all usually involving the postulation of some new fundamental in nature. And I'm not opposed to McGinn's mysterianism.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07597410735412554920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-74080722177360108302008-04-25T04:31:00.000-04:002008-04-25T04:31:00.000-04:00Here is a hypothetical model of qualia...1) qualia...Here is a hypothetical model of qualia...<BR/><BR/>1) qualia are not effected by entropy or any similar laws independent of the physical world (otherwise we might notice the effect). So you can have any number of qualia in any instant and it costs nothing to access them.<BR/>2) qualia are highly atomic - i.e. red could be 10 or 1000 different unique qualia added together (the reason for this is <BR/>A) that there is a theoretical experiment where I start a qualia in a person's brain that would have been red then stop it halfway and still have a result<BR/>B) and the way we construct meaning from words is reducible. <BR/><BR/>This implies it is reasonable to think there is no individual qualia that has any sensible meaning, but there may be multiple sets (collections of qualia triggered by a state of mind) with more or less the same meaning.<BR/><BR/>3) the way the law picks what pattern to use is extremely complex, because it has to give some apparently different patterns. the same results and similar patterns different results.<BR/><BR/>4) the presumably rich nature of human experience means that a yh'person' can experience qualia and yet not know it in the same way they can hear a sound and yet have no record of that even an instant afterwards. This is just a failure to connect the data to the main part of your brain - but the qualia have been created so it shows the qualia can be absorbed by you and yet not be 'felt' by 'you' in a certain sense (hence the quote marks).<BR/><BR/>5) Memories of qualia refer to different qualia (the reason for this is that the pattern triggering them has different physical traits so should trigger a different qualia, although it is presumably a similar qualia for similar reasons to why a physicalist would say it seems similar)<BR/><BR/>Maybe no qualia is ever reused.<BR/><BR/>6) zombie contain no value no matter how organized they might be - so I'll say qualia carry value in and of themselves - so a blinding flash of qualia is a state of value. It is also of course a 'perspective' regardless of if it forms a structure with meaning (like a thought).<BR/><BR/>I imagine you could take different position but that's a model.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-68530459177663107472008-04-25T04:23:00.000-04:002008-04-25T04:23:00.000-04:00Hi Scott - 1) I agree with you that qualia seem a ...Hi Scott - <BR/><BR/>1) I agree with you that qualia seem a different sort of problem than we've had to solve before. But that goes without saying to some extent - if it was the same sort of problem as we'd had before, we'd have solved it by now. Lots of ways of trying to classify it into its own special unsolvable category ("we need a more functional explanation", "science has never had to solve phenemology" etc) are basically just restating the question. Yes, we know the problem is subjectivity. No, we haven't solved anything like it yet, as we haven't solved subjectivity yet.<BR/><BR/><BR/> But it doesn't seem at first glance (or even a priori) harder to me the problem of life does, or did. With science's track record in eventually coming up with solutions, I think it certainly deserves the benefit of the doubt - especially as we're nowhere near finishing exploring the physical structure of the brain or how it works.<BR/><BR/>Evangelical Christians rightly get criticised for resorting to "god of the gaps" sort of arguments. I think its a sad day if philosophy has to resort to the same sort of thing.<BR/><BR/>I sense you agree with me mostly in substance, but differently in emphasis. The incompatibility of relativity and QM is a problem for physics - it is not a reason by itself to deny physicalism. The burden of proof seems to me to hugely be on the side of Richard's team to show why this case is different to other unsolved problems. <BR/><BR/>At the moment their argument seems to come down to some sort of gut instinct "it just is different" (or in longer form "I can imagine it not being a consequence of the laws of physic and biology, therefore it could not be, therefore it isn't" etc.) - and I'm very uncomfortable with philosophy proceeding on that basis, rather than argument, logic and empirical data.<BR/><BR/>2) On the second point, I still don't see a complete picture of how this works. <BR/><BR/>I think some confusion may be coming in my sloppy use of the term 'qualia'. I'm less concerned about what qualia go on to cause, than what is it that causes qualia/the experience in the first place? What is the medium that gets the sensation from the object to the qualia? And what / who is it that experiences the qualia?<BR/><BR/>Chalmer's bridging laws seems a bit of an explanation for the medium answer of that at any rate - though rather ad hoc. It doesn't say who the who is.<BR/><BR/>Basically if<BR/><BR/>Object -> light -> eye-> brain<BR/><BR/>What's the equivalent for qualia?<BR/><BR/>Object -> 'bridging laws' -> ?<BR/><BR/>Richard seems to have rejected<BR/><BR/>Object -> 'bridging laws' -> non physical brain (/ soul)<BR/><BR/>which would be the classic dualist explanation<BR/><BR/>So I can think of 2 possible further explanations:<BR/><BR/>Object -> 'bridging laws' -> physical brain<BR/><BR/>which doesn't seem to be ephiphenomenalist<BR/><BR/><BR/>Object -> 'bridging laws' -> qualia<BR/><BR/>in which our soul is nothing more than our experience of qualia. They're floating separately and not cause of anything back in the physical world - they just 'experience' as it were, without making decisions, or having any personality or intelligence of their own, or cohesive unity (all that stuff exists back in the physical mind and brain).<BR/><BR/>The last seems to best I can do to put together all the strands of Richard's position into some sort of coherent picture.<BR/><BR/>Richard, is that what you're saying?Jonathanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02028612648881844683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-31640244412239669802008-04-25T01:38:00.000-04:002008-04-25T01:38:00.000-04:00Scott,> And asking such questions, we've gotten gr...Scott,<BR/><BR/>> And asking such questions, we've gotten great biological answers.... For instance, we've never called upon biology to explain subjectivity before.<BR/><BR/>You seem to be asking for a certain type of explanation obviously not the sort that traditional psychology, evolutionary psychology and neuro-psychology, and quantum physics provide.*<BR/><BR/>So what sort of explanation is it? <BR/>What form of answer would a physical explanation that satisfied you take? For that matter - what form of non physical explination would satisfy you?<BR/><BR/>Do we have that sort of explination of an organ? I think probably not, and to add the other perspective - a physicalist would probably argue its a nonsense question.<BR/><BR/>> Aren't qualia defined as first-person experiences?<BR/><BR/>the issue this creates for me is 'do qualia communicate with each other?' if so I have a larger argument for you - if not, you are just tiny splinters of a person. do you really want to be a million individual things each with one sense for one instant (and thats it, no ability to self reflect on that), or to be the sort of meaningful thing that a physical human is?<BR/><BR/>Adam, <BR/>OK i guess we can term that the 'it's a draw, lets move on' argument? Sounds like what most of philosophy seems to have decided.<BR/><BR/>------<BR/>*for example that we could make a human and control their behavior/subjectivity and know what we are doing we know why it isn't meaningful to talk about a rock having a useful perspective.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-38708122910523884792008-04-24T22:21:00.000-04:002008-04-24T22:21:00.000-04:00Genius:oh I suppose you are making the simple assu...Genius:<BR/><BR/><I>oh I suppose you are making the simple assumption that its necessarily impossible...</I><BR/><BR/>I'm not making the assumption that it's necessarily impossible. I'm pointing out that there's no good reason to believe that it's possible (or at least, I haven't yet seen one).<BR/><BR/>As I said in my previous comment, you can't just assert that it's possible to hold everything else about the world constant, but subtract consciousness. If you do that, you're not <I>arguing</I> for dualism, you're <I>assuming</I> dualism! Obfuscating this circular argument with terms like "psycho-physical bridging laws" doesn't make it any less circular.<BR/><BR/>I'm not saying that this thought experiment is either necessarily possible or necessarily impossible. I'm saying that we just don't know the answer; and assuming what the answer must be, based on nothing more than our intuitions of what's conceivable, is a foolhardy endeavor. Sure, we can <I>imagine</I> a world that was exactly like our own in all physical respects but lacking qualia, just as we can imagine a perpetual motion machine that you can build out of stuff in your garage. But in both cases, just because we can imagine it doesn't mean that it's actually possible under the physical laws that pertain in our world.Adam Leehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01522250341263457480noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-43881422653571234372008-04-24T17:52:00.000-04:002008-04-24T17:52:00.000-04:00Ben, The argument is that the burden is on the oth...Ben, <BR/><BR/>The argument is that the burden is on the other side to show why the scenario <EM>is</EM> impossible. Perhaps that's not where you think the burden should be, but it strikes me as the reasonable spot.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07597410735412554920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-11154097743346615802008-04-24T17:36:00.000-04:002008-04-24T17:36:00.000-04:00I don't like the jump from ideally conceivable to ...I don't like the jump from ideally conceivable to possible. Anytime you don't fully understand something you can imagine plenty of impossible scearios. How can we tell that that's not the case here? It's certainly fair to say that we don't know whether or not it's possible but that's not enough. What am I missing?benhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17349603983957093745noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-90317977707932156942008-04-24T16:33:00.000-04:002008-04-24T16:33:00.000-04:00I do not agree that we have any reason to think th...<EM>I do not agree that we have any reason to think that there is not a biological explanation for this.</EM><BR/><BR/>That's too strong. There are certainly reasons for doubting a forthcoming biological explanation. For instance, we've never called upon biology to explain subjectivity before. Certainly we can ask how a cell produces proteins and the like, or how organs work, etc. And asking such questions, we've gotten great biological answers. But we've never had an answer to a question for the why of a subjective experience. So skepticism is warranted here. Now these reasons may not control, but they are certainly there, and not insignificant.<BR/><BR/>That being said, while there are reasons to doubt a forthcoming biological explanation, it may be that the parsimony of materialism is reason enough to bet on it.<BR/><BR/><EM>b) The second point is what I was trying to get into in our last conversation on the topic : what is the epiphenomalist picture of how all this works? Qualia exist as non physical properties of our objects - but through what method or chain of causation do they cause our first person experience of them? Is that first person experience itself in my physical mind, or in a non physical soul?</EM><BR/><BR/>I find this question odd. "How do qualia cause first-person experiences of them?" Aren't qualia defined as first-person experiences?<BR/><BR/>But I believe I know what you're asking. Chalmers advances what he admits are tentative theories--briding laws--such that certain organizations in nature will produce certain qualia, as a fundamental rule. <BR/><BR/>As to epiphenomenalism's response, Chalmers gives two basic responses that I recall: <BR/><BR/>1. Qualia simply don't cause things--they are inert. Or perhaps qualia are redundant as causal agents--they cause something that is also caused by physical causes. Neither view seems fatal.<BR/><BR/>2. We don't understand causation anyway, so it may well be that qualia are causal--we just need a fuller understanding of causation to see how. <BR/><BR/>Richard's defended the first view on the blog before--the post being something like "Why do you think you're conscious?"Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07597410735412554920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-16833713773120057462008-04-24T14:43:00.000-04:002008-04-24T14:43:00.000-04:00On the first point, I agree that qualia exist as a...On the first point, I agree that qualia exist as a distinct phenomenon (the sensation of blue is more than just the current physical description we currently have the frequency of blue light etc.) and that currently we have no idea how waveforms, particles and so on turn into our sensations. I do not agree that we have any reason to think that there is not a biological explanation for this.<BR/><BR/>I think we can close off this area of discussion at any rate - I'm happy now that I understand where you're coming from, even if I reject it. (Which is ironic actually, as I started up this discussion rather fond of the Zombie argument. Oh well.) <BR/><BR/>My second point is the same as I asked up thread - please reference my own post up thread ! :) :<BR/><BR/>"b) The second point is what I was trying to get into in our last conversation on the topic : what is the epiphenomalist picture of how all this works? Qualia exist as non physical properties of our objects - but through what method or chain of causation do they cause our first person experience of them? Is that first person experience itself in my physical mind, or in a non physical soul?"<BR/><BR/>In other words, if that's not clear, give me the physical (or non physical / spiritual) picture of how this all works. Or at least a hypothesis of how it might work.<BR/><BR/>For example, I can see a table due to : light given off by the sun bounces off said table into my eye - which is converted into the visual information of a table by my brain.<BR/><BR/>How does that work for qualia? How does the sensation get to me? What is the 'me' - physical brain, soul, non physical brain etc. ?<BR/><BR/>Descartes had a picture of a soul, pineal gland, and brain - you seem to be rejecting that - but what do you put in its place?<BR/><BR/>That's at the heart at what I've been asking for in all these discussions of souls and so on - the term 'property dualism' in response doesn't really tell me anything.Jonathanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02028612648881844683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-80299113542839451142008-04-24T11:02:00.000-04:002008-04-24T11:02:00.000-04:00I'm not sure what you're asking. My reason for thi...I'm not sure what you're asking. My reason for thinking that qualia must be included in the base facts (i.e. they are not reducible to anything else -- physical or otherwise) is the argument given in the main post. If you grant that qualia are irreducible, but insist nonetheless that they are properly classified as 'physical', I say this is a mere terminological dispute. (See my responses upthread, e.g. to Clark.)<BR/><BR/>Your second "long-standing question" looks to me like a meaningless jumble of words. I don't see any coherent question there.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-31866824830022932672008-04-24T10:44:00.000-04:002008-04-24T10:44:00.000-04:00Okay, thanks for the link. Reading it, it seems to...Okay, thanks for the link. Reading it, it seems to your argument is that vitalism is different because it can't be reduced to functional terms. I'm not absolutely convinced that a vitalist needs to argue that, but I'll let it be for now.<BR/><BR/>I must admit I found the following quote from you highly amusing:<BR/><BR/>"You couldn't have a world physically identical to our own in all respects, but somehow biologically different."<BR/><BR/>Exactly right :)<BR/><BR/>Anyhow, more seriously you obviously think qualia aren't biological.<BR/><BR/>So I return to the same question again - would be grateful if you could just provide a yes or no : is your sole argument or reason for thinking qualia are non physical the Zombie intuition? <BR/><BR/>(If you could link to me to a reply about my second long standing question about the chain of causation of qualia in the object to our sensation, souls and the like, that'd be great too, but one point at a time I guess.)Jonathanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02028612648881844683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-28867880313668957752008-04-24T10:16:00.000-04:002008-04-24T10:16:00.000-04:00I discuss the vitalism analogy here.I discuss the vitalism analogy <A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2006/05/global-supervenience-and-physicalism.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-59107693877018752392008-04-24T06:36:00.000-04:002008-04-24T06:36:00.000-04:00Hi Richard -so from the posts and replies you've m...Hi Richard -<BR/><BR/>so from the posts and replies you've made your only argument that qualia aren't physical is (incredibly contraversial) Zombie intuition?<BR/><BR/>Right?<BR/><BR/>One of the normal replies is that the medieval philosopher could use exactly the same argument to argue that life itself must be more than just a physical phenomenon - we can conceive I suppose of a world with all the same physical laws, but with nothing alive. Or we could at any rate till we learned about evolution.<BR/><BR/>What's your reply to that?Jonathanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02028612648881844683noreply@blogger.com