tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post134426528794598785..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Three Dogmas of UtilitarianismRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-12979021535882950382021-03-28T11:56:46.331-04:002021-03-28T11:56:46.331-04:00A few quick and sketchy points on this question in...A few quick and sketchy points on this question in case they're helpful:<br /><br />A view like the one Richard mentions in (3) might differ from a "Desert-Adjusted Utilitarian" view. For example, many “desert”-based views depend on total, global assessment of character traits. There's less (or perhaps even negative) moral value to promoting the interests of the vicious rather than the virtuous. A view based on responsibility, might differ by focusing on the responsibility for particular acts.<br /><br />To illustrate, suppose Moe culpably and recklessly pushes Curly and Larry down a hill, caring not at all about what happened to him. In the process, Moe trips from the force he had to exert. The three of them tumble down. Moe and Curly each have a very painful broken arm. Larry only suffers a minor sprain to his wrist. Now, you have one pain killer that will relieve all of one of the individual's pain. Moe is responsible for the fact that he's worse-off than he otherwise would have been. Curly is not responsible. This comparative fact about responsibility may give us reason to discount the moral value Moe of well-being. Larry, on the other hand, stands to benefit to a lesser degree than Curly since Larry has a less intense injury. Therefore, even though they're both innocent in this case, giving the pain killer to Curly will produce more well-being. On this “Responsibility-Sensitive Utilitarianism,” we ought to give the pain killer to Curly.<br /><br />Now, Curly may be equally as vicious as Moe once all character traits are accounted for. If so, the Desert-Adjusted Utilitarian wouldn't agree with the view just mentioned. It would permit giving the pain killer to either Curly or Moe. So part of the answer to the Doolittle case might just be that not all ways of making utility sensitive to responsibility will involve maximally global assessments. Responsibility for one's less-than-optimal prospects in a particular forced-choice scenario may be all that's necessary for discounting in that forced-choice scenario. This still makes for interesting results in a range of cases (Self-Defense cases and so on). Moreover, on this view Doolittle (or perhaps someone with whom it's easier to sympathize) will be equally responsible for his plight, perhaps, as any other innocent party with a longer life span. If both fail to be responsible for whatever plight they face, neither of their interests will be discounted. They're thus relevantly like Curly and Larry. So deviations from the impartiality of utilitarianism only occur when one is responsible to some degree. (Note if no one is responsible for anything because determinism or whatever else, then the view will just be extensionally equivalent to utilitarianism.)<br />Jimmy Goodrichhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10003740056629556284noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-82032768139816386662021-03-25T09:30:39.163-04:002021-03-25T09:30:39.163-04:00There are interesting questions about how best to ...There are interesting questions about how best to develop the details of the view. But I don't take the mere existence of such questions to constitute an objection. (That is, I don't yet see any reason to doubt that the questions could be given plausible answers.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-52973181068981610162021-03-25T04:25:08.143-04:002021-03-25T04:25:08.143-04:00"3" seems problematic to me - I can hear..."3" seems problematic to me - I can hear Alfred Doolittle explaining he is one of the undeserving poor. And how far retrospectively do we have to look to assess someone's innocence viz arguments one should save the person with shortest life expectancy given their previous bad luck.David Duffyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12142997170025811780noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-78794853500388495212021-03-20T15:59:53.428-04:002021-03-20T15:59:53.428-04:00Sounds good! Feel free to share a link to any pap...Sounds good! Feel free to share a link to any papers you have on this if/when they're ready for broader consumption...Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-8988283898468939532021-03-20T15:52:14.004-04:002021-03-20T15:52:14.004-04:00Here to register solidarity with "heterodox c...Here to register solidarity with "heterodox consequentialism," and especially with point (3). A bit of a shameless plug: I've been working on the view that we should give priority to the interests of the innocent - which I call, "Luck Utilitarianism" - and argue that it allows the consequentialist to provide a better account than they have thus far of the ethics of self-defense. Excited to learn that other card-carrying consequentialists have found the idea compelling.Jimmy Goodrichhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10003740056629556284noreply@blogger.com