tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post116805517328249839..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Constructivism and IntuitionsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1169260530547197592007-01-19T21:35:00.000-05:002007-01-19T21:35:00.000-05:00I'm not too familiar with any of that -- possibly ...I'm not too familiar with any of that -- possibly 'constructivism' and what I called 'conceptualism' are the same thing? I don't see any obvious link here to moral contractualism. What did you have in mind?Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1169132472723092802007-01-18T10:01:00.000-05:002007-01-18T10:01:00.000-05:00Are you therefore embracing a form of "costructivi...Are you therefore embracing a form of "costructivism" as a meta-philosophical theory? Scanlon is such a constructivist. Do you think there is a necessary connection between being a constructivist in your sense and being a contractualist in Scanlon's or Rawls sense? Or one could be either without being the other?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1169102672688266862007-01-18T01:44:00.000-05:002007-01-18T01:44:00.000-05:00Yes, very helpful!Yes, very helpful!Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1168842859065622392007-01-15T01:34:00.000-05:002007-01-15T01:34:00.000-05:00Sorry for the belated response...Clayton - I'm com...Sorry for the belated response...<BR/><BR/>Clayton - I'm committed to saying that the ideally rational agent would believe in Conceptualism rather than Platonism, if that's what you mean?<BR/><BR/>Alex - yeah, there are obvious risks of circularity here (compare my old post on <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2006/06/bootstrapping-possibility-as.html" REL="nofollow">bootstrapping modality</A>). So we'll need to take <I>something</I> as primitive. I'm inclined to favour the normative facts (e.g. about what ideally rational agents would believe; or, to avoid Euthyphro, whatever reasons lie behind these beliefs). What do you think is the best option here?Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1168314596486712752007-01-08T22:49:00.000-05:002007-01-08T22:49:00.000-05:00Richard,Would an ideally rational agent think that...Richard,<BR/>Would an ideally rational agent think that their intuition motivated beliefs aimed at an independent reality?Clayton Littlejohnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05596200828134402805noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1168192328508722392007-01-07T12:52:00.000-05:002007-01-07T12:52:00.000-05:00intuition is just what we call decisions made wher...intuition is just what we call decisions made where we can't remember what the justification was.<BR/>Actually almost everything is intuition.<BR/>GNZAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1168081436198228712007-01-06T06:03:00.000-05:002007-01-06T06:03:00.000-05:00Hi Richard,I generally agree with your position, t...Hi Richard,<BR/>I generally agree with your position, though I tend to frame the issue little differently...<BR/>1)To intuit a truth =def. to comprehend something.<BR/>2)When something is comprehended, there is no need for additional justification.<BR/><BR/>So the way I see it the question:"how is this faculty supposed to work, exactly?" , has two different answers:<BR/><BR/>a) The simple one: It works by comprehension of something (e.g. relations between notions)<BR/><BR/>b) How comprehension works? <BR/>There can be different attempts of grounding the comprehension in something else, one is for example the Kantian attempt to explain its possibility (though he frames it little differently, i.e. "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?"), but to my thinking in ideal case the answer can be nothing but comprehension of relation of thought and notion (or subject and world).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com