tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post115858821973340081..comments2010-03-19T21:55:05.766-04:00Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235r.chappell@gmail.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1158677851560362392006-09-19T10:57:31.560-04:002006-09-19T10:57:31.560-04:00Conceivability entails possibility when applied to possible worlds. But conceiving meta-modal scenarios is not likewise empowered to ground metaphyical conclusions. It sounds right, although I guess it does seem more an assertion than an argument.<BR/><BR/>As Chalmers said briefly in that paper (section 12), conceiving a necessary being meta-modally implies conceiving that "concievability entails possibility" is actually false when applied to worlds (since we can conceive of a world without the being). Extending this, you might say the advocate of this necessary being story is actually assuming the falsity of the "C entails P" thesis in order to create a scenario intended to defeat that same thesis.<BR/><BR/>Does this mean we could make the general claim that arguments from meta-modal premises have no force in defeating "C entails P" since they must at least implicitly assume its falsity to get off the ground?Stevehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01520183807002220677noreply@blogger.com