tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post115563019844815714..comments2008-10-12T22:38:11.685-04:00Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235r.chappell@gmail.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1155652345110014482006-08-15T10:32:00.000-04:002006-08-15T10:32:00.000-04:002006-08-15T10:32:00.000-04:00Richard,<BR/><BR/>This is a very interesting topic to me. But because it is very confusing too I will not myself get into it much. This topic was brought up in some of the comments of John DePoe's entry, <A HREF="http://blog.johndepoe.com/?p=92" REL="nofollow">"Russell on Berkeleyan Idealism."</A> One would have to sift through all the comments to find the relevant remarks, but I think it might be worth it. The philosophers who I know to be very relevant here are Berkeley and Locke, and maybe a little Descartes (I'm not sure about Descartes though). I know most roll their eyes at Berkeley but, in my opinion, whether he was ultimately right or not, he had much of importance to say of these sorts of matters.Don Jr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/08252704984728663115noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1155630969515419372006-08-15T04:36:00.000-04:002006-08-15T04:36:00.000-04:002006-08-15T04:36:00.000-04:00See also Pete Mandik's post: <A HREF="http://philosophyofbrains.com/2006/08/14/what-are-you-conscious-of-when-you-have-conscious-experiences.aspx" REL="nofollow">What are you conscious of when you have conscious experiences?</A> It addresses the question of whether we are conscious of our experiences themselves, in addition to whatever it is that our experiences are about. (On Tye's view, we can only be aware <I>that</I> we are having an experience -- I assume we infer this from the fact that we are aware <I>of</I> external objects. I think that's fairly plausible. What does everyone else think?)Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.com