Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: The Problem with Non-Philosophers

Genius, I agree so much with what you say on 'the ...

2010-03-03T16:12:29.581-05:00

Genius, I agree so much with what you say on 'the problem with philosophers'. I fear I probably reflected a lot of those traits in my earlier years. While I disagree that philosophical problems need to have real life relevance to be worth debating, I think if you're going to seriously raise an abstract point for debate (rather than in a banterous/speculative context), you should be prepared to not become so infatuated with your belief that it becomes immune to rational critique. Some thought experiment situations can never exist but neither can a frictionles plane, and again, 'numbers' aren't literally rational or irrational. I think of thought experiments, however *temporally* bizarre, to be worth thinking about if they make a wider conceptual point, or reveal a fundamental weakness in an idea. Anyway I might add to your list of problems with philosophers:

1) Pretending not to understand what others are saying because they didn't say it in philosophese. This, to me, is one of the most offensive habits that some philosophers have when talking philosophy with non-philosophers. This reflects a general disdain for non-professional philosophers, I think.

2) Inventing terms. I consider most terms of art to be 'landmarks' in a discipline rather than metaphysically essential. They're a way of fixing the parameters of discussion on a limited issue or aspect. Philsophers tend to get carried away making up new words (especially, I think, in continental philosophy). This confuses discussions and adds unnecessary hermeneutical complexities for people who read such work in the present or the future. And it looks like cheating: a deus ex machina for problematic arguments. Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, whom I consider to be two of the most forceful philosophers of all time, spoke and wrote in colloquial, aphoristic prose, to great effect. We could probably learn something from that. Unless I'm talking to a fellow philosophy student or academic, I avoid using jargon unless it's as a signpost. I like ideas to be as naked as possible (one of the things that attracts me to the analytic tradition).

3) Lack of charity. When debating with other philosophers, philosophers sometimes have the tiresome habit of giving the least reasonable interpretation to what their interlocutors say or write, or focussing on red herrings and presenting them as fatal to the argument. I think it's best to treat ideas quiet(ist)ly first, however much you don't like, and only then put your own forward as alternatives. I always assume that people aren't wrong on purpose.

4) Texts (or names) over substance. This applies perhaps more to philosophy students than to academic philosophers. There's a tendency to treat philosophy as a series of texts, quotations and names rather than attempts to solve or address certain epistemic or existential problems. As you say Richard, philosophy is a mode of inquiry, not merely a canon of texts.

That said, I find intelligent (or shall I say 'intellectuall confident') people with strong opinions and no, or minimal, philosophical training, to be the most difficult to deal with. It seldom occurs to them that their views are fallible. They look for 'corrct' views rather than 'better' ones, and they tend to use logic dishonestly, or otherwise over-praise rationality as an action-guiding standard.

In a final point, I reject the common view among philosophers and non-philosophers alike, that philosophy has no relevance to real life. Theoretical mathematics has limited relevance to anything other than maths departments, but the concepts and conceptual clarifications they discover can have spillover use in other areas from software design and data management, to simply creating controlled 'worlds' to test ideas. I suspect people essentially conceieve of the world -- even its physical properties -- in an abstract context. To this extent, philosophy remains a useful way of tidying up our patterns of thinking, a little.

Luke of 'Common Sense Atheism' offers some example...

2010-01-16T12:22:18.048-05:00

Luke of 'Common Sense Atheism' offers some examples from his own experience, here.

I have the same problem but logic should entail to...

2008-12-03T03:45:17.665-05:00

I have the same problem but logic should entail to look at it on both sides. Logic is like asking someone to accept something that completely contradicts peoples beliefs theyve relied on for years.

Maybe its just me but many people who are illogical are also not the quickest minded. Logic should force you to look at myself as truthfully as possible. That problem to you is a good one. I would love to say im an intellect over im a moron. Imagine reading a book and maybe 1 idea per page gets through to you. Thats the elegant universe to me at this moment. I completely believe that acceptance is best in the long term though, no ego equals barely any depression.

This is a simply outstanding post - the same gripe...

2008-11-21T10:35:10.099-05:00

This is a simply outstanding post - the same gripes have been niggling away at me for ages.

My mother is a particular case in point. I will calmly explain to her that if she believes A (which she claims to believe), then she cannot also believe B (which she claims to believe) for they are logically incompatible. I then ask her to choose A or B...and she says both.

At this point rational argument gives out and my head explodes.

Thank you, this neatly sums up much of the frustra...

2008-01-26T02:01:53.167-05:00

Thank you, this neatly sums up much of the frustration I have faced today.

Richard,I have been quite fascinated by the procee...

2008-01-17T07:18:55.976-05:00

Richard,

I have been quite fascinated by the proceedings of this post, but I wonder if the difference we are considering here is not one of trained philosophers and laypersons, but one of the "professional" versus the "casual" logician.

Most important to me is point 1 and it's various responses, especially Miss M.'s response about philosopher's also closing their minds to new ideas. I would like to argue both for and against philosophers here.

For: I know in the past, I have been accused of being quite stubborn in my opinions. One friend, however, hit on the true source of the problem. He said he didn't like arguing with me because I have already considered the options he is presenting, so I made the conversation seem quite one-sided, much the same way that someone who was deadset in his opinion might make it. My argument for philosophers in this case then is that, given they are clearly interested in the topic, they have thought about their opinion rigorously and possibly had very similar arguments with other philosophers and friends, giving them many opportunities to have already changed and fully formed their opinions. In contrast, the layperson must react on his/her feet, meaning his arguments can often seem ill-conceived.

Against: Directly following from this notion then is the idea that such a scenario can, if not presented the correct way on the part of the philosopher, seem like a rapid-fire barrage of counter-arguments, seemingly shooting down the layperson's arguments almost before they are finished fleshing them out. Put in such a situation, many people, including philosophers would become defensive and slightly less rational.

So I came to realize that I needed to spend the time to use some dialogic techniques, such as paraphrasing and proper listening skills to encourage the other person to explore his/her viewpoint more fully. This can run counter to a linear process at times, indulging tangents to see what the person really meant by the tangential line of inquiry. The goal, of course, is to get back on the main track in an explorative, rather than an argumentative, way. Essentially, this involves a cooperative, rather than a competitive means on arriving upon a solution to a particular inquiry.

So I would posit that it is not always the case that non-philosophers are close-minded or do not respect the proper path of inquiry, rather it is merely that they are less practiced in a particular argument or line of thought. For example, while I could hold my own in a discussion on social philosophy, I would have more trouble with someone trained in metaphysics (or physics for that matter).

Either way, I agree with Richard that philosophical ways of thinking should be taught to children, especially in areas of creative thinking and mathematical reasoning.

-pocket

Well, I'd assume we all are here, myself included!...

2007-08-29T20:10:01.716-04:00

Well, I'd assume we all are here, myself included! I suppose with that not entirely serious quip I was thinking more in the context of readership beyond a small set of phil grad students and professors.

That said, I do often prefer Nozick, Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and others who, perhaps, write in a more "playful" style.

Oh, I'm kinda partial to pretentious bores...

2007-08-29T19:20:12.327-04:00

Oh, I'm kinda partial to pretentious bores...

A problem with philosophers? How about far too man...

2007-08-29T12:44:25.063-04:00

A problem with philosophers? How about far too many lacking any sense of humor, lightness, or grace in their writings and lectures. By this I don't mean constantly making jokes, puns, etc. (though if Derrida's your thing you can find plenty of those there). I mean, rather, possessing a kind of self-aware modesty. One might also say irony...in a limited sense...or playfulness. A subtly explicit recognition that "Though I'm pretty sure you don't know what you're talking about, you know what...I may not know what I'm talking about either." And being comfortable with that. This is distinct, I believe, from acknowledging you might be wrong on an "intellectual" level, which I'm sure every philosopher is concerned with. Well, maybe not Searle. jk

Internalizing this very simple thought leads to a somewhat different, more approachable, and in my opinion more valuable and convincing style of argument and writing. Plus it makes you not such a damn pretentious bore! Surely that is useful!

I might add that this is something I think Richard tends to do pretty well and is a large reason why his blog is so successful.

A problem with non-philosophers? My biggest peeve is one Richard named: an unwillingness to follow an argument in any kind of depth.

Great thread Richard. I really enjoy the discussi...

2007-08-29T07:11:51.746-04:00

Great thread Richard. I really enjoy the discussions you host on this blog. I will like to respond briefly to the first objection raised by Miss M.

It seems to me that, since everything in the world is utterly connected at very subtle and deep levels, the best way to broaden ones thoughts, and thus arguments, is to consider any connection that the mind presents.

I believe the starting premise of this argument illustrates what many philosophers find frustrating about talking to non-philosophers. The claim that ‘everything is connected’ is taken to be so obvious, as not to warrant defence, when it is not even clear what the claim means. If we mean that everything in the universe is physically connected (in the sense that every atom is connected to every other atom via a finite string of intermediary atoms) then this claim is trivial to the point of being vacuous. It certainly has no bearing on the rational structure of arguments. If this is supposed to be rational claim, that every proposition is evidentially connected to every other proposition, then this claim seems plainly false. Sun spots are not evidence that olive oil is healthier than corn oil, even if the sun is partly responsible for growth of both types of plant. Whatever physical relationship may exist between sun spots and the health benefits of olive oil is completely irrelevant to the argument at hand. So what, pray tell, is the significance of the starting premise, ‘since everything in the world is utterly connected’?

Certainly most people do exhibit this ignorance (w...

2007-08-29T01:37:00.461-04:00

Certainly most people do exhibit this ignorance (which was precisely my complaint), but why think that they must? (i.e. that their ignorance is incurable?)

I'm sure that there are biological humans who are ...

2007-08-29T01:11:51.083-04:00

I'm sure that there are biological humans who are inherently incapable of logical reasoning, but I'm not sure they count as "people" and they aren't numerous. However, it seems possible to me that the vast majority of people are inherently incapable of seeing the point of much philosophical discourse. They can follow the logic if they really try, but don't care about the subject and have difficulty seeing how anyone else could care (for which reason they often think that philosophy is all just excuses for power as posited in crude post-modernism).

Michael, that's right -- I'd simply say that how m...

2007-08-28T22:34:36.331-04:00

Michael, that's right -- I'd simply say that how much philosophical training is "sufficient" will vary between individuals! (Unless you mean to suggest that some people are inherently ineducable when it comes to logical reasoning?)

seems to me to assert that the groups you are desc...

2007-08-21T12:42:44.348-04:00

seems to me to assert that the groups you are describing are those who have and have not experienced "sufficient philosophical training", while it seems to me that the difference is substantially temperamental, and cannot even be reliably predicted by IQ style intelligence, creativity or a philosophy PhD. Many people who have never formally studied philosophy are found in both groups.

In the 1950s, BBC Radio (UK) used to broadcast the...

2006-05-16T08:44:21.376-04:00

In the 1950s, BBC Radio (UK) used to broadcast the Philsophy Department seminars from University College, London, seminars chaired by the head of department, AJ Ayer. I'm not sure this had any marked impact on the quality of British discourse.

One problem is (this is somewhat idiosyncratic) th...

2006-05-14T20:04:09.776-04:00

One problem is (this is somewhat idiosyncratic) that communication about abstract matters is difficult and people on both sides of the philosopher/non-philosopher divide tend to forget that. Without some of the common background that philosophy classes give you, it becomes really hard to see what the implicit premises being employed are. A lot of philosophical discussions end because one or both parties lose track of the dialectic and follow an unfruitful tangent, like you pointed out. I think it needs to be acknowledged that following a dialectic and only paying attention to premises that are in play is a skill that requires training and refinement. Of course, at least in the US, this is not helped by the idea that argumentation is some sort of pugilistic encounter that is more mixed with rhetoric and posturing than with reasoning and counter-examples. It might be the same way in Australia.

In response to your discussion of thought experiments and hypotheticals in (4) and (5), there are a couple of possibilities that I think you're leaving out. Applying the idea behind a thought experiment to another situation might be an attempt to undermine the intuition you think the thought experiment brings out. If the second case is relevantly similar but doesn't support the conclusion, someone needs to explain how it either changed an important basic part of the hypothetical or how it isn't actually relevant. Relatedly, someone could be trying to generalize your point in an obvious way. If it doesn't generalize, this could indicate a fault in the argument, although it may not.

The last thing I wanted to say is that I agree that general discourse is in bad shape. On the West Coast, there is some effort to change this. One of the ideas behind John Perry and Ken Taylor's radio show, Philosophy Talk, was to introduce philosophical ideas and reasoning into the general public discourse. (I saw that your blog links to their blog.) I work for their show and we have gotten several emails from people (non-philosophers) how nice it is that there is some clear discussion and argumentation on the radio. It is also reasonably popular, so there is definitely an interest out there for this sort of thing. I hope that curbs your despair a little bit.

pdf23ds: Have you seen Wikireason by any chnace? I...

2006-05-12T13:50:39.236-04:00

pdf23ds: Have you seen Wikireason by any chnace? It looks just like that argument mapping thing you've linked to, but in Wiki style. It's criminally underused, and I think it has to do with Richard's point that people don't really know how an argument works.

>>As long as you're aware of their limitations. As...

2006-05-11T14:25:09.686-04:00

>>
As long as you're aware of their limitations.

As I said, their obvious limitation is that they are guaranteed to generate confusion and misunderstanding

>>>Given this inability of very clever professiona...

2006-05-11T14:23:18.130-04:00

>>>
Given this inability of very clever professional philosophers to find justification for the use of the standard rules of deductive logic

How would we justify rules of logic? By some kind of argument?

"they are the most perfect and unconfusing form of...

2006-05-11T12:55:50.500-04:00

"they are the most perfect and unconfusing form of argument ever invented."

As long as you're aware of their limitations.

I wish to take up your point 6, by raising a disti...

2006-05-11T12:55:49.533-04:00

I wish to take up your point 6, by raising a distinction raised before by commentators to this blog: that of the cultural dependence of modes of reasoning. There is strong anthropological evidence that not all societies use the same rules of inference known and loved in western philosophy. Given this fact, one could ask (as some philosophers have, eg Susan Haack) how one could justify the standard rules of deductive inference.

To take one example: Modus Ponens. If you try to justify the use of this rule of inference with examples of its application, you are using a form of inductive reasoning to justify a deductive inference rule. That seems too weak a justification. If, on the other hand, you try to justify MP using arguments based on truth tables, you will find (as Haack noted) that you will be using Modus Ponens itself in the justification.

Given this inability of very clever professional philosophers to find justification for the use of the standard rules of deductive logic, I think the ground underneath your point 6 is very shaky indeed.

Can I also recommend this. http://www.angelfire.c...

2006-05-11T08:47:07.213-04:00

Can I also recommend this.

http://www.angelfire.com/nv/mf/elia1/school.htm

"The modern schoolmaster is expected to know a little of every thing, because his pupil is required not to be entirely ignorant of any thing. He must be superficially, if I may so say, omniscient." How true (except that was written two hundred years ago).

Agree with all of this, though Brandon's point abo...

2006-05-11T07:34:09.730-04:00

Agree with all of this, though Brandon's point about 'good taste', i.e. an 18C all-roundedness that modern education no longer cultivates, is a good one. If for example you compare Hume's writing on economics, which delve into all sorts of odd corners of his classically-educated world, with any modern writing on economics, you will see what I mean.

As for thought experiments, I gave up long ago of using them with non-philosophers. What is it about them? I don't know, but they are guaranteed to generate confusion and misunderstanding. But they are the most perfect and unconfusing form of argument ever invented.

As to whether philosophers often fall short of the...

2006-05-10T12:56:12.780-04:00

As to whether philosophers often fall short of their rational ideals: seems to me that academia sometimes rewards a certain level of arrogance and close-mindedness, when it's a side effect of single-mindedness and dedication. I think this is true of any thinking profession, whether in philosophy or cognitive science or evolutionary biology. So I don't think singling out philosophers for attack here is appropriate. On the other hand, singling out philosophers as the prototypical "rational debater" isn't really appropriate either, as that virtue is just as useful in some other areas of academia. One could just as well call it "the problem with non-scientists". I think better, though, would be to call it "the problem with non-rationalists", or perhaps, "the problem with non-bayesians", a la Yudkowsky.

Genius,Not currently. I'm really considering getti...

2006-05-10T12:46:28.160-04:00

Genius,
Not currently. I'm really considering getting a blog up though. However, my blog won't be specifically philosophy related so much as just what-im-pondering related.