tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post114266787807468844..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Externalist a priori justificationRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142986420154486802006-03-21T19:13:00.000-05:002006-03-21T19:13:00.000-05:00Well, maybe it is not relevant, it all depends on ...Well, maybe it is not relevant, it all depends on how you define the boundaries of your discussion and that is basically independant of me or the rest of the universe.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142981859313437382006-03-21T17:57:00.000-05:002006-03-21T17:57:00.000-05:00Im changing the point at which we evaluate the con...Im changing the point at which we evaluate the conditional truth<BR/><BR/>>If that isn't what you meant, note that you cannot know with certainty that you are typing. You might just be hallucinating the whole experience.<BR/><BR/>Yes, but if you read it it is true. If you dont read it I have lied to noone (except debatably myself? in this case no) and so there is no potential for harm? so it is utilitarian?<BR/><BR/>Just wondering if this changes things.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142930904253081202006-03-21T03:48:00.000-05:002006-03-21T03:48:00.000-05:00G, did you mean to point to the tautology: "if I a...G, did you mean to point to the tautology: "if I am typing, then I am typing" (as a specific instance of the form, "if P then P")? Such trivial logical truths can clearly be known <I>a priori</I>, without appeal to experience, so they're not interesting cases for the present discussion. I'm wondering whether there are things we can know with certainty, but only on the basis of experience. Rationality alone is not enough to justify them. "I am conscious" seems quite different from mere tautologies in this respect. [If that isn't what you meant, note that you cannot know <i>with certainty</i> that you are typing. You might just be hallucinating the whole experience.]Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142929904878559992006-03-21T03:31:00.000-05:002006-03-21T03:31:00.000-05:00I expect your already fully considering this but t...I expect your already fully considering this but to put it in simple language...<BR/><BR/>> No. You don't know if you're typing<BR/><BR/>if I'm not I can't be in error - so it doesnt matter? What I'm looking at here is - do we care about this sort of truth? If so why?<BR/><BR/>> Genius needs help with his typing skils. <BR/><BR/>Cruel!!!Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142829661912298342006-03-19T23:41:00.000-05:002006-03-19T23:41:00.000-05:00Does that matter, though? Or is the existence of m...Does that matter, though? Or is the existence of mistaken deflationary/functional states sufficient to trouble the externalist, even if there aren't any <I>conscious</I> states which go wrong here? Perhaps if we think zombies aren't really <I>persons</I> at all, then my zombie-twin is not a genuine counterpart of mine, and so can be excluded from consideration. This might allow the externalist to deny there are any a posteriori certainties after all. (But it seems kind of wrong-headed to me. I'll have to think about it some more.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142828542032694082006-03-19T23:22:00.000-05:002006-03-19T23:22:00.000-05:00But then could a Zombie be thinking "I am consciou...But then could a Zombie be <I>thinking</I> "I am conscious"? He could say it, but could he think it in the sense Descartes considers? It doesn't seem like he could since the thought requires consciousness of a sort the Zombie lacks.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142750510105062902006-03-19T01:41:00.000-05:002006-03-19T01:41:00.000-05:00A 'zombie world' is a world physically identical t...A 'zombie world' is a world physically identical to our own but lacking in phenomenal consciousness or qualia. It is filled with people just like us, except that they are not truly conscious -- there is not "something it is like" to be them. Philosophers call those people 'zombies'. Now, when my zombie twin says "I am conscious", he says something false.<BR/><BR/>Another way to make the point is as follows: If (counterfactually) I hadn't been conscious, then I still would have believed myself to be conscious (at least in the 'functional', deflationary, sense of 'belief'), and that belief would have been false. So my belief that I am conscious is not absolutely "safe" in the <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2004/04/skepticism-and-possible-worlds.html" REL="nofollow">externalist's</A> sense. I could have had the belief mistakenly. (It is only certain in light of my introspective evidence. It would not be certain without that, i.e. <I>a priori</I>.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142747031279899932006-03-19T00:43:00.000-05:002006-03-19T00:43:00.000-05:00Richard, you say:But there are zombie worlds in wh...Richard, you say:<BR/><BR/>But there are zombie worlds in which my counterpart is mistaken in having this belief.<BR/><BR/>wd you explain?<BR/><BR/>Genius:<BR/><BR/>Wittgenstein's comment on "I think therefore i am" was: "It looks like it's going to rain therefore I am". ;-)<BR/><BR/>IB: <BR/>Genius needs help with his typing skils. U of nowhere offering courses in typing?Sir Ghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07953581535133000686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142704098396310652006-03-18T12:48:00.000-05:002006-03-18T12:48:00.000-05:00No. You don't know if you're typing or hammering t...No. You don't know if you're typing or hammering the keyboard with your fingers.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1142672898710101192006-03-18T04:08:00.000-05:002006-03-18T04:08:00.000-05:00heh just like "i an typing, therefore I am typing"...heh just like "i an typing, therefore I am typing" is true... <BR/>or is it?Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.com