tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post114085266969900931..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Concepts of PossibilityRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1141066649517295372006-02-27T13:57:00.000-05:002006-02-27T13:57:00.000-05:00I think there is something in your notion of absol...I think there is something in your notion of absolute possbility which is very deep and very important to the way we relate to the world. Attempts to reduce it seem to miss the essential flavor. I look forward to your further thoughts on this.<BR/>Best -<BR/>Steve EsserStevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1141002901691821392006-02-26T20:15:00.000-05:002006-02-26T20:15:00.000-05:00Richard, I'm with the second option myself. I'm pr...Richard, I'm with the second option myself. I'm pretty sure the reason it's hard to analyze is because there's no there there (much the same way I feel about qualia). I don't have a knockout argument, but the way that any attempt at making sense of such a notion of non-relative modality seems to fail is good enough for me. I really don't even see why we need it.Matt McIntoshhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14268874489737727182noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140936120724473392006-02-26T01:42:00.000-05:002006-02-26T01:42:00.000-05:00> we will find various (now closed) branches that ...> we will find various (now closed) branches that really were, at one point, metaphysically open possibilities.<BR/><BR/>it is clear from physics that almost everything is possible it is just that most things are unlikely - so I expect a fuzzy boundary between possible and not possible. There may not even be such a thing as "not possible" (in this sense).<BR/><BR/>Otherwise of course if we exclue the way the universe realy is and look at the philosophical representation then I guess one would say, as other posters have said, that it is a matter of contradicting known principles (the problem is WHAT ARE these known principles?).<BR/><BR/>In relation to "what might have been" I would assume (correctly or incorectly) that the person meant "in relation to the normal laws of physics" and "in relation to some assumptions about individuals behaviour" that would result in some sort of a coherent useful answer. The problem is I might have different assumptions to you<BR/><BR/>For example you might ask "what might have been yesterday - <BR/>to me "richard killed matt" is a "might have been" but it may not be - you have more information than me but also probably more assumptions.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140919033250658452006-02-25T20:57:00.000-05:002006-02-25T20:57:00.000-05:00Alejandro, I think my postscript addresses your qu...Alejandro, I think my postscript addresses your questions. I don't know whether it's true that the world really could have turned out in any logically possible way; at least it doesn't strike me as a <I>trivial</I> truth, the way your analysis would make it.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140918071046048932006-02-25T20:41:00.000-05:002006-02-25T20:41:00.000-05:00Matt, that's certainly what I used to think, but w...Matt, that's certainly what I used to think, but what do you make of the intuitive concept ("what really might have been") that I've pointed to in the main post? Do you lack this concept? Or do you think it hides a deeper incoherency? Or do you simply think that nothing in reality satisfies it?<BR/><BR/>I think only the second option can form an adequate rebuttal here. The third option is plainly foolish: at the very least, what is <I>actual</I> is (trivially!) something that is really possible in my sense. Perhaps you think nothing else is really possible, other than what is actual, but then you're not rejecting my concept but instead making substantive claims about its application. The first type of response also seems inadequate, since the problem there presumably lies with the people who lack the concept, and not with the concept itself.<BR/><BR/>So what we need to do is argue that the notion of absolute possibility is somehow incoherent. But what sort of argument would that be? The common-sense notion sure <I>seems</I> coherent enough, at least on first glance, though its certainly difficult to analyse!Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140885549287927042006-02-25T11:39:00.000-05:002006-02-25T11:39:00.000-05:00I'm throwing in with Alejandro and Kim. I don't th...I'm throwing in with Alejandro and Kim. I don't think it makes any more sense to refer to "possibility" without any relative frame of reference than it does to refer to ethical permissability without any context. (e.g. "Is it permissible to lie?" It depends! Relative to what situation?) I don't see why this would be unsatisfactory or surprising either -- we know that we can't even refer to <I>motion</I> in a non-relative sense, which runs even more afoul of our everyday intuitions. Sometimes your intuitions are just wrong.Matt McIntoshhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14268874489737727182noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140869652853200832006-02-25T07:14:00.000-05:002006-02-25T07:14:00.000-05:00I thought the same as Kim. Why can't you say that,...I thought the same as Kim. Why can't you say that, if "relative possibility of P" is consistency of P with respect to some assumed framework F, then "absolute possibility of P" is just that P is not self-contradictory? (nor entails any self-contradiction when joined with purely <I>logical</I> principles?<BR/><BR/>The only answer I can imagine is that you would be relativizing your notion of "possibility", after all, to a set of logical principles which determine what is and what is not contradictory, and there may be alternative logics to choose. But if one believes in alternative possible logics, then I imagine the most natural thing would be to stop looking for a notion of metaphysical "absolute" possibility (which would bring with it an associated absolute notion of necessity) and instead take a pragmatic (Quinean?) view of both logic and modality.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140860585666252592006-02-25T04:43:00.000-05:002006-02-25T04:43:00.000-05:00Kim, that analysis sounds fine to me. It just does...Kim, that analysis sounds fine to me. It just doesn't sound like a fundamentally <I>modal</I> analysis. It instead sounds (to me) like a reduction of the modal to the logical.<BR/><BR/>"<I>Do you have any argument for your thesis that consistency (or consistency with some theory) is conceptually distinct from possibility?</I>"<BR/><BR/>I'm not sure. I know that I think of the two of them differently, as seen in the open question argument, but you might have different concepts from mine. As I understand it, "consistency" is a matter of obeying various formal rules (e.g. the law of non-contradiction), we might say it is a <I>merely logical</I> notion. Absolute possibility, as I use the term here, is a <I>metaphysical</I> notion, concerning "what might have been".<BR/><BR/>But perhaps this distinction is a red herring. I think my real issue is with the distinction between 'relative' and 'absolute' modal concepts. I'm wanting to highlight the absolute notion of what is possible, <I>simpliciter</I>, as opposed to what is F-possible for some framework F.<BR/><BR/>An analogy with ethics might help. We can say that an action is R-permissible when it is allowed according to some framework of rules R. (Then we can talk about what is legally permissible, or Biblically permissible, etc.) But none of those relative notions capture the fundamental normative concept, or what we <I>really ought</I> (or are permitted) to do. (See also the early paragraphs of <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/10/ought-we-to-be-rational.html" REL="nofollow">this essay</A>.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140856708764019642006-02-25T03:38:00.000-05:002006-02-25T03:38:00.000-05:00Interesting post! But i'm afraid our intuitions so...Interesting post! But i'm afraid our intuitions somewhat diverge.<BR/>Do you have any argument for your thesis that consistency (or consistency with some theory) is conceptually distinct from possibility? Your open question-claim doesn't really convince me...<BR/>Why, for example, couldn't we analyse "physically possible" as "is consistent with an ideal(maybe yet to be discovered) physical theory"?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com