Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Super-human values

the funny thing about philosophy is that even if y...

2006-01-22T13:02:00.000-05:00

the funny thing about philosophy is that even if you do provide an argument that wins a debate (or clarifies a point) the "other side" almost never realises/can accept it. That and people using different definitions of words stunts philosophy I guess (not that I'm blaming anyone in particular).

Yeah, I just don't think he means the same thing b...

2006-01-22T03:36:00.000-05:00

Yeah, I just don't think he means the same thing by "intrinsic value" as we do. He seems quite clear on the point that he thinks that desire-based value is real. Your objections all rest on ignoring this latter point.

"The issue before was that you believed the theists were saying that apart from a divine "magical spark" humans have no intrinsic value."

My objection to theistic value-theory is the claim that our value is contingent on God giving it to us. There is no such contingency in Alonzo's value theory. (Though if you're correct, there's not actually any real values in his "value theory" either. That would certainly be a worry! But we'll let him clarify that one.)

I think it would help to re-read Alonzo's comments...

2006-01-22T02:57:00.000-05:00

I think it would help to re-read Alonzo's comments, because he explicitly denies the existence of intrinsic value in general and in human beings a couple of times during this discussion. In your first response to me, Richard, during this discussion you even suggested that Alonzo denied the existence of intrinsic value, so I think you might be inadvertently vacillating here, in the last couple of posts, as regards your interpretation of Alonzo's position.

Richard, maybe it will help if you clarify what th...

2006-01-22T02:42:00.000-05:00

Richard, maybe it will help if you clarify what the difference between Alonzo's position ("Humans don't have intrinsic value") and the position which you thought certain theists held in your "Positive Atheism: Ethical Stability" post. You took the theists to task for what you thought was their position (and given that you thought that was their position, I would agree with your reaction, but I'm not certain that the position you attributed to them was in fact their position). But you seem not so critical of Alonzo's position. I do not see a difference in the aspect of their positions that warranted your previous reaction. The issue before was that you believed the theists were saying that apart from a divine "magical spark" humans have no intrinsic value. You saw the position "Humans have no intrinsic value" as being "utterly repugnant." Alonzo is saying the same thing. What's the difference? Of course he says that we can perceive people as being valuable, but I've already discussed how that has nothing to do with intrinsic value; so what's the difference in their positions? (And it must be a fairly significant difference if it allows you to see one as sensible and the other as "utterly repugnant.")

As an aside, I don't see what's so confusing about "Humans don't have intrinsic value." What's to misunderstand there?

Also, you seem, Richard, to attribute to Alonzo blatantly contradictory notions that I don't think he holds to. Alonzo clearly denies that humans have intrinsic value. In your last post, you tried to explain how he thinks our desires actually give us intrinsic value (though he has given me no reason to think he believes that). So you are saying that Alonzo believes that humans don't have intrinsic value and, yet, that our desires give us intrinsic value? Aside from the fact that that's blatantly self-contradictory, I've already discussed how perceived value can't amount to intrinsic value, and you already conceded that intrinsic value must be accounted for ontologically, that is, through our natures. So if you're saying that Alonzo believes our desires or perceived value give us intrinsic value, then your just attributing poor reasoning to him.

Also if Alonzo held that people have intrinsic value, but that it's just derived from our desires, then I wouldn't be arguing the point that his position is scary, because in that case it wouldn't be (since he would hold that people are intrinsically valuable). But he doesn't hold that people are intrinsically valuable, so it seems like you're just attributing positions to him that he doesn't hold to. Of course Alonzo can step in and speak for himself here. (However, if Alonzo held that we do have intrinsic value and that it is derived from desires then I would just argue the point that that isn't likely, that intrinsic value, maybe even by definition, would have to be accounted for ontologically, not instrumentally).

> Well then your point is not analogous to mine, s...

2006-01-22T01:56:00.000-05:00

> Well then your point is not analogous to mine, so I'm not sure that it's really relevant.

haha I dont have to have a certain position for it to be true or worthy of investigating and proving true or false. Otherwise you would be proven wrong just by opposing me!

> My point was that "Human beings don't have intrinsic value" has direct implications that are frightening

My scenario did not require special circumstances at all (do oyu believe intrinsic value is the only sort of value? in which case you are exposed to the scenario but Alonzo may or may not be as per his defense). It sounds "ridiculous" just because it is a better example of why the argument is "ridiculous" and it clashes with your preconcieved notions which of course makes you more aware of it.

> Contrarily, from "Human beings have no intrinsic worth," "That little girl is worthless" is not the result of asinine reasoning.

Alonzo defends his point just above.
Anway - almost no one believes "Human beings have no intrinsic worth," in such a way that you could directly infer "That little girl is worthless". Do you honestly think they do??

Well, I think you're misunderstand what Alonzo mea...

2006-01-22T01:34:00.000-05:00

Well, I think you're misunderstand what Alonzo means when he denies "intrinsic value", as explained in my previous comment (where I pointed out exactly where your misunderstanding was). But instead of trying to second-guess him, let me describe an interpretation of his position that makes it a more clearly reasonable one. This interpretation sees his denial of "intrinsic value" as simply meaning that there is no value independent of human desires. Put another way, desires are the source of real ('intrinsic') value. Because people have desires, and desires have value, it follows that people have value. Simple.

Your continued objections involve disregarding someone's desires. But that's morally wrong according to a moral theory which says that all people's desires matter. So your objections are simply way off target (on my interpretation of his theory). They would apply if Alonzo also denied that desires have value. If he did that, I would also be concerned. But this interpretation of yours seems strongly at odds with what he's actually said (all of which supports the view that he thinks desires create a form of value that is 'real'.)

Richard, I am perplexed as to why you are defendin...

2006-01-22T01:15:00.000-05:00

Richard, I am perplexed as to why you are defending Alonzo's position as being sensible since just recently you took certain theists to task for suggesting that his (Alonzo's) position would be true if God didn't exist (to give us a "magic spark" one might say) and referred to that notion as being "disrespectful to humanity," "morally bankrupt," and "utterly repugnant" (see
"Positive Atheism: Ethical Stability").

Richard, I do not mean to misconstrue or twist Alonzo's position, but if you think that I have, could you please point out, for my sake, exactly which statements in my last post were guilty of "twisting" Alonzo's theory (and I'm not sure why we keep referring to "Human beings have no intrinsic value" as being theory)? Personally, I do not think that I have twisted his "theory." I think that I have only showed—again and again—that it has appalling implications, without twisting it. (If one thinks that because I have presented an appalling consequence of Alonzo's position that I must have twisted it somewhere, then I think that's just absurdly question begging. But, to be sure, I'm not accusing anyone of doing that; I just hope that no one is doing that.)

Alonzo holds that nothing has intrinsic value. Thus it follows that, on his view, human beings don't have intrinsic value. This is where my former points come in, such as the point that no amount of perceived value can amount to intrinsic value. No matter how much Mr. Smith values Little Ann, Little Ann is still intrinsically worthless, on Alonzo's view. Similarly, no matter how much Mr. Smith values money, money is still intrinsically worthless—it's just paper. Taking something I think we can all agree on, Mr. Smith's being a greedy, money hoarding megalomaniac (who obviously values money very much, maybe even too much) doesn't make destroying paper—specifically paper with dead president's faces on it—morally wrong. Make a parallel assessment, which would follow given Alonzo's position, regarding human beings and I think you end up with an "utterly repugnant" view of humanity. (How that is twisting Alonzo's position is unclear to me. It just seems to be following it to its logical conclusion.)

> The idea of "picking value", I think, is absurdi...

2006-01-22T00:57:00.000-05:00

> The idea of "picking value", I think, is absurd

i really dont see how you are getting around that problem. your answer doesnt seem to adress it - probably because I dont think it is possible for you to have an answer that addreses it.
A value could be a "real" thing if you want, humans are real inteligence is "real".

Don, you seem to be ignoring the fact that the lit...

2006-01-21T18:52:00.000-05:00

Don, you seem to be ignoring the fact that the little girl will herself have desires, and that these "values" will exist independently of what anyone else happens to think of her. Thus it seems plainly false on Alonzo's view that she's "just a means to an end" (unless you mean to include her own ends in that formulation, and then it is no longer so "utterly appalling"). You keep trying to twist his theory to justify ignoring the desires of some people. But that's just not part of his theory at all.

Your final objection, about a society full of evil 'people in general', is more pressing. (Though presumably such a society would still be far more desire-thwarting in total than the alternative where people lacked such evil desires. This counterfactual provides grounds for calling the rapist's desires "evil", and seeking to change them all, to create a more harmonious society.) An alternative response is outlined in my post 'consistency and utilitarianism', which you can find under the 'fav posts' section of the sidebar.

Alonzo, all throughout your last post you said or ...

2006-01-21T15:31:00.000-05:00

Alonzo, all throughout your last post you said or implied that I rejected your view or thought it false because it was frightening and scary. However, I never gave an argument to reject your position because it was frightening and scary. Indeed, I never gave an argument at all (and I stated that); rather, I just presented observations or concerns. In fact, to avoid being misconstrued, I made it explicitly clear (several times) that that—presenting an argument for rejecting your view—was exactly what I was not doing. I honestly don't know how you missed all those statements and how you missed the fact that I never said anything close to what you're suggesting I said. (Exactly where did I say we should reject your view because it was scary?) Moreover, I never said anything at all about rejecting your view. I said it was frightening and that you had given no reason for it but rather had simply asserted it as true; however, I never once said to reject it for either of those reasons, so I don't see any basis for the bulk of your response. (This is the second time that the bulk of your response has been completely beside the point.)

Also, I said your position was scary because "it is a mindset that could easily, directly result in very large-scale evils." Are you saying that the thought of the universe winding down fits that criterion? If not, then your remarks there are completely irrelevant and non-analogous.

Do you think that money qua pieces of paper is valuable? Of course not. Money is only valuable insofar as it is useful as a means to an end; but in and of itself it's just paper. No one would be angry at loosing money at the hands of a paper shredder simply because a piece of paper was destroyed. They would be upset that something which was useful to them (and thus desired by them) was lost. If we translate this to people the idea is just utterly appalling: human beings aren't really valuable, they only mean something if they're useful to (and thus desired by) someone else. So as long as someone doesn't actually desire some little girl, then the child rapist's actions are perfectly okay. But even if the little girl is useful to someone else, she still lacks any real (intrinsic) value; she's just a means to an end. That type of mindset is just utterly appalling. (Notice that, again, I said nothing about rejecting the view; I just made a simple observation about it's ramifications and how absolutely frightening and appalling they are.)

As an aside, I would still like to know if you think that in a society of child rapists, since the child rapists would be the "people in general," that child rape would be okay. And if not, then why not? And also, given that you hold to your position because it is "useful," I'd still like to know why believing that humans have intrinsic value isn't just as "useful" and more, since you could still accomplish all you wanted to plus some.

Misc. Comments:Don Jr.: You continue to argue tha...

2006-01-21T10:16:00.000-05:00

Misc. Comments:

Don Jr.: You continue to argue that if some belief can produce certain results then that belief must be true. I've never heard of that theory of truth before.

I was responding to the argument that you were giving that suggested rejecting my position because it was "frightening" and "scary". There are two responses to that. "Frightening and scary does not imply false", and "There is nothing to be frightened about." I gave both responses.

His relates to the long discussion between Don Jr. and genius regarding whether theories have scary implications. I see no merit to whether it is true or false that "every theory can have scary implications." I do not know if it is true or false. I see no reason to care.

Many of the theories of physics -- those that the universe will wind down and become lifeless is "frightening" to some people. The theory that there is no God and nothing after death is "scary" to some people. Yet, nowhere is this a reason to reject the theory.

"Frightening and scary" does not imply "false".

However, "Theory T is frightening and scary" can be false, and it is reasonable to object to this statement.

Don Jr.: You said, "Nothing has value independent of desire." You have yet to actually defend that statement...

This is a statement about what does not exist. Like all such statements, in its fully fleshed out form, it says, "There is no evidence for the existence of any reason for action (value) independent of desire."

As such, it is not up to me to provide the evidence. I await somebody else to explain the where, why, what, and how of any other type of reason for action.

Genius: Also I don’t think atheism implies that humans have no "value" because in that sense we get to define value and being humans we can quite logically pick ourselves to equal it.

The idea of "picking value", I think, is absurd. If we have the capacity to "pick value" then what we are really saying is that, "Nothing really has value, but we are going to play this game of let's pretend where we get to pick certain things and pretend they have value. So, let's pretend that human beings have value."

In contrast to this, I hold that values are real-world entities. They exist in the form of relationships between states of affairs and desires. They are real in the same way that brains are real, in the same way that the beliefs and desires themselves are real.

This is not a game of make-believe.

Don Jr.: My initial point was that "Nothing has value independent of desire" is a very scary statement.

How can it be "scary" -- except in a question-begging sense. If it is true that all value exists in the form of relationships between states of affairs and desire. Nothing is "scary" except that which threatens to thwart some very strong desires. A person who is afraid of something that does not threaten strong and stable desires has an irrational fear.

The implications you see are irrational.

Part of irrationality comes from misinterpreting the statement to say, "Nothing has value independent of my desires." This position would, indeed, be frightening. but it is not a position that I hold. It is not a position that I even think is coherent.

Rejecting my view by asserting that it is identical to this view, and rejecting it, is a classic "straw man" fallacy.

Don Jr.: Contrarily, from "Human beings have no intrinsic worth," "That little girl is worthless" is not the result of asinine reasoning. It's perfectly rational reasoning. And that is very frightening.

No it is not rational. This argument requires the additional premise: "The only type of value that something can have is intrinsic value."

I reject this premise.

Value exists. Value is real. However, value is not an intrinsic property.

This is the same as saying that weight exists. Weight is real. However, weight is not an intrinsic property.

Human beings have no intrinsic worth. However, states of affairs in which the little girl is well off still has value. And, in virtue of the fact that the desire to rape little girls is a desire-thwarting desire (it is a desire that tends to thwart other desires), it has negative value.

This negative value is very real, and I can defend it, but I do not need "intrinsic value" to do so.

Alonzo Fyfe
The Atheist Ethicist

Don, it's hardly reasonable to say that the only s...

2006-01-21T06:08:00.000-05:00

Don, it's hardly reasonable to say that the only sort of answer you'll accept is one which explains how our value could come from somewhere else. That's just to beg the question against the position that we have intrinsic value, in virtue of our own natures (and not contingent on God's whim).

Well, firstly, I find it reasonably hard not to object to being referred to as hardly reasonable. (But I'll let it pass.) Secondly, I was merely saying (in previous comments) that our perception of us having value doesn't give us intrinsic value. I agree that intrinsic value must be ontologically based (i.e., within our nature). My problem was that I don't think naturalism can provide this ontological difference, which is why I said I think Alonzo's position is more consistent with his atheism (although, to be precise, it is consistent with a naturalistic atheism).

On my position, it is necessary, given our nature, that we have value.

As it is on my position as well.

On my position, it is necessary, given our nature, that we have value. It is not possible that someone could be just like us in all natural respects, but still lack moral value.

As it is on my position as well, which is why your reductio fails. (I don't think you fully understand my position partly due to your fixation on the "magical spark" thing, which tends to hinder you from taking it seriously—or at least it seems that way.)

My issue was never that a naturalist could or couldn't recognize intrinsic human value or that our natures (ontologically speaking) can't account for our value. In fact I do think that our natures (ontologically) account for our value, which is why it's intrinsic value, not extrinsic or subjective value. Rather, my issue was that naturalism doesn't seem to be able to account for this ontological distinction in our nature necessary to establish (the existence of) intrinsic value. At certain times my overall point got blurred, but I was still arguing along the same line (or at least meaning to).

I am also baffled by why you think sentience is an 'arbitrary' condition for moral value.

That is one of my points that got blurred. To clarify, I meant that it is completely arbitrary to say that sentience is the thing that gives us an ontological difference, presupposing naturalism. Again, what about human beings in non-sentient states? Do they temporarily loose their intrinsic value? ("Oh he'll gain back his intrinsic value when he comes to, but right now he's worthless.") That can't be right; but that would seem to follow, if you're basing intrinsic value on sentience. I agree that sentience may be some indicator to having intrinsic value; but to say sentience = ontological difference just seems completely arbitrary. Furthermore, to say We are sentient beings (obviously) and we also have intrinsic value (obviously), thus all is well just misses the point. Naturalism still fails to account for the existence of that intrinsic value which must have some ontological basis. That is the key issue. (And being a fast runner requires no ontological distinction, so your remarks there are irrelevant.)

No not at all, I am making it clear that I CAN mak...

2006-01-21T05:55:00.000-05:00

No not at all, I am making it clear that I CAN make that argument.

Well then your point is not analogous to mine, so I'm not sure that it's really relevant. My point was that "Human beings don't have intrinsic value" has direct implications that are frightening, not that such and such scenario can happen given the existence of some ridiculously asinine individual.

Contrarily, from "Human beings have no intrinsic worth," "That little girl is worthless" is not the result of asinine reasoning. It's perfectly rational reasoning. And that is very frightening.

Also, God-given is not the same as God-valued (or God-perceived), so I don't think the second comment you made in your last post holds. (I briefly touched on the distinction in an earlier comment.)

'Well "just having [moral value] there" seems to b...

2006-01-21T02:54:00.000-05:00

'Well "just having [moral value] there" seems to be avoiding the question altogether, not giving an answer.'

Don, it's hardly reasonable to say that the only sort of answer you'll accept is one which explains how our value could come from somewhere else. That's just to beg the question against the position that we have intrinsic value, in virtue of our own natures (and not contingent on God's whim).

Note (as argued in my 'positive atheism' post) that on your view, there could be a human just like you or me in all natural respects, except that God chose not to give them that magic spark of value. So it would be morally okay to torture and abuse them. Even though they (being sentient) would feel pain and suffer just as we would. I think this is a compelling reductio of your position.

On my position, it is necessary, given our nature, that we have value. It is not possible that someone could be just like us in all natural respects, but still lack moral value. (The natural facts determine the moral facts.) This is a far more plausible position.

To help understand how this supervenience works, consider the property of being a fast runner (if that's too subjective, replace it with "being capable of running a four minute mile in standard conditions", or some such). Once you fix all our physical properties, there is nothing more that needs to be added to make it true that someone will be a fast runner. Necessarily, anyone physically identical to a fast runner will themselves be a fast runner. There's nothing God can do to change that, any more than he could prevent two and two from being four. And it's not an extra property he has to "give". It's just there, supervening on the underlying natural facts. I would suggest that our moral value is similarly just there.

I am also baffled by why you think sentience is an 'arbitrary' condition for moral value. (I've never heard that before!) A conscious creature can suffer or rejoice, and has an interest in promoting the latter over the former. To have interests is to have intrinsic moral value. All seems perfectly obvious to me?

> Genius, you are arguing that "Human beings have ...

2006-01-21T02:02:00.000-05:00

> Genius, you are arguing that "Human beings have intrinsic worth" directly implies that people will be hindered from crossing the street and thus put into comas?

No not at all, I am making it clear that I CAN make that argument. this really goes back to methods of argument as opposed to the implications of the particular argument.

> Similarly, if we have intrinsic worth it seems not to be reasonable to suggest that we gave it to ourselves

You seem to define "worth" in a certain way.

I expect many (probably including richard) would dispute that god given worth is actually real worth (ie lets say god valued torture [because he was evil or somthing] then torture would still not be "valuable" in many people's eyes). I guess in that case your just talking different languages.

(note I'm weird in that dont always argue exactly for my own oppinion!)

Genius, you are arguing that "Human beings have in...

2006-01-21T01:34:00.000-05:00

Genius, you are arguing that "Human beings have intrinsic worth" directly implies that people will be hindered from crossing the street and thus put into comas?

As regards my "satisfactory answer" remark, I admit I was not clear in my distinction there. What I meant was, in keeping with my prior example, if God exists, then it is plausible that He created the universe; therefore, "God created the universe" seems to be a satisfactory answer in the sense that it is prima facie plausible in the absence of any philosophical presuppositions (such as naturalism or supernaturalism), that is, from a purely hypothetical perspective. On the other hand, if we exist, it still isn't plausible that we created the universe, unless one wants to suggest a very unconventional (even scientifically contradictory) understanding of what the universe is (and even then, it's plausibility would be in question). Similarly, if we have intrinsic worth it seems not to be reasonable to suggest that we gave it to ourselves; that is to say, that we are the source of something ontologically inherent in us (i.e., intrinsic value) seems to be clearly implausible. Surely we can be the source of perceived value (merely perceived value) but that was not the issue. Hopefully what I meant is clearer now, though whether you agree with it or not is obviously a different issue.

I might as well give the example."Human being's ha...

2006-01-20T21:14:00.000-05:00

I might as well give the example.

"Human being's have intrinsic worth"
now we will take this to mean
"ONLY humans have intrinsic worth and that is the only type of worth that exists" (otherwise you always have an out regarding having lots of other undefined principles) This is basicaly the same as your interpretation of "Human being's don't have intrinsic worth" which seems to convert it to somthing not far from "humans dont have value".

Now on to the implications -
1) Lets say this is my one and only objective in life
2) Lets say you are doing a day to day activity like crossing the road.

Since I don't care at all about your desire to get to the other side of the road I am totally neutral to that.
BUT I DO care about your life which has intrinsic value.
Since there is a small risk involved in allowing you to cross the road (or even get out of bed) I have a incentive to prevent you doing those things - by force if nessercary. And if you continue to take risks I might put you into a coma (and of course take care of you and keep you alive).

there you go - obvious "sacry implication".

> "Human beings don't have intrinsic value" is obv...

2006-01-20T15:45:00.000-05:00

> "Human beings don't have intrinsic value" is obviously guilty of this.

I dont think anyone is proposing "nothing has value".
If you propose desire has value and desire (or somthign else) is intrinsic to humans then humans automaticaly have value - it solves the problem. rather like my being made of molecules doesnt stop me from being made of atoms.

now you can asume that the other person meant "humans have no value and therefore htey should not be valued but that is a bit like someone making a similarly twisted asumption regarding "humans are valued" (I expect you might have thought of some from the last post - clearly It would take a bit of twisting, but so does yours).

> The second answer isn't even satisfactory at all though.

an athiest might say the first answer defies their definition of the universe. The universe includes everything so it cant be created by "somthing" creating the obvious "what created god". Or they could say we did create the universe (by observing it). Things are not so simple to easily reject propositions like that.

To add to my last comments, even if "Human being's...

2006-01-20T11:10:00.000-05:00

To add to my last comments, even if "Human being's have intrinsic worth" can be shown to be somewhat dangerous (by a very far stretch of the imagination no doubt) it still doesn't compare to the patent grotesqueness of "Human being's have no intrinsic worth" or, to make the distinction more stark, "That little girl is worth nothing." That's the only point I meaning to make.

Basically every theory can do that [i.e., directly...

2006-01-20T11:00:00.000-05:00

Basically every theory can do that [i.e., directly result in very large-scale evils]. Just name one and it wont be that hard to demonstrate.

Firstly, I don't know why you keep saying theory. "Human beings don't have intrinsic value" doesn't seem to be a "theory." (But maybe we have different takes on what a theory is.) Remember that I say the direct implications of that "theory," since you want to call it that (although I think "mindset" better suits it), are horrific. (Stress: The implications are of that theory, not of some distortion or misrepresentation of it.) "Human beings don't have intrinsic value" is obviously guilty of this. (Again, that doesn't make it not true. I'm just saying that it could, if followed through, lead directly to very large-scale evils.) You say to just give another theory and it could easily be shown that it (not some distortion of it) too will directly lead to very large-scale evils. Okay. How about "Human beings have intrinsic value." I don't see the immanent danger in that, but maybe I am missing something.

such is philosophy particularly athiestic philosophy of course.

I don't at all think philosophy, even "atheistic philosophy" (though I'm not quite sure what that is), is a bunch of poorly reasoned assertions.

My point is that, in a sense, this requires all the same assumptions as the athiestic argument it just shuffles them around a little. for example you have to initiate value somwhere - many utilitarians might do this at god level or at a human level etc. But lets say there were no humans then an athiest could equally do it at the ant level if that was the highest animal.

Genius, in a sense I agree with you, but I think you're erring when you fail to distinguish between satisfactory and unsatisfactory answers, as I think you are doing here. Say someone asks me, "How do you account for the existence of the universe?" I could say, "God created it." I could also say, "We created it." The first answer, as an answer, is satisfactory. Now of course many will contest it's truth, but that's not the issue here yet. (I guess by satisfactory I mean "prima facie plausible," although I suppose that some would contest that my first response was satisfactory even by that standard.) The second answer isn't even satisfactory at all though. Similarly, saying we gave ourselves intrinsic value isn't a satisfactory answer; that is, it's not plausible even at first glance (at least not to me). You're right though, the intrinsic value we have (if we have it, which hopefully it is obvious that we do) has to come from somewhere; I agree. But it can't come from anywhere. (If, in the above quote, you were speaking of subjective, extrinsic value, then I would agree with your comments, but I'd still think one would have to account for intrinsic value where, in that case, my above remarks would apply.)

Richard, to be honest with you, I haven't just sat...

2006-01-20T10:10:00.000-05:00

Richard, to be honest with you, I haven't just sat down and spent a couple of days thinking about and reading on, specifically, how atheism could account for ontological differences in value. It seems to me, at least prima facie, that atheism would struggle with this issue. The topic was discussed in your "Positive Atheism: Ethical Stability" entry. I wasn't personally convinced of any of the arguments there, but I need to mull over them (and others) more.

You ask, "Why not just have it there, unconditionally, as a part of our nature? (Perhaps supervening on the fact that we are sentient, or whatever you think it is that determines whether something has intrinsic value.)" Well "just having it there" seems to be avoiding the question altogether, not giving an answer. As regards the sentient basis for it, that just seems to be arbitrary and rasies too many questions which seem, in my opinion, to lack a satisfactory answer: Why sentience? Why not aquatic ability? And what about human beings in non-sentient states?

Thank you for the note on atheism and ontology, as regards materialism, physicalism, and the like. I need to read more on that subject matter.

> it's scary because it is a mindset that could ea...

2006-01-20T01:30:00.000-05:00

> it's scary because it is a mindset that could easily, directly result in very large-scale evils (a few past examples come to mind).

Basically every theory can do that. Just name one and it wont be that hard to demonstrate.
In practice a person who consideres everyones desire (in a utilitarian sense and over a period of time) would probably act far better than most humans alive by most measures of "better". In ability to do this properly is what results in many of the scary implications I expect somthign Alonzo is probably trying to point out - that doesnt mean all are cleared up in this way of course.

> My point now is that Alonzo has given no reason for asserting it (that is, for believing it to be true) other than to say that it is "useful," which is a poor reason for believing something to be true.

such is philosophy particularly athiestic philosophy of course

> Our value isn't relational; it's ontological. It's God-given, not God-perceived. God doesn't perceive us as valuable and thus we are given value; rather, He gives us value and thus He perceives us as valuable (because we are).

My point is that, in a sense, this requires all the same assumptions as the athiestic argument it just shuffles them around a little. for example you have to initiate value somwhere - many utilitarians might do this at god level or at a human level etc. But lets say there were no humans then an athiest could equally do it at the ant level if that was the highest animal.

Don, I'm not sure why you think that our ontologic...

2006-01-19T17:35:00.000-05:00

Don, I'm not sure why you think that our ontological value is God-given. Why not just have it there, unconditionally, as a part of our nature? (Perhaps supervening on the fact that we are sentient, or whatever you think it is that determines whether something has intrinsic value.) That's what my 'positive atheism' post was arguing for. (You're right that this departs from my earlier 'relationalism', held in the 'god-given value' post.)

Also, re: your earlier comment, note that atheism is nothing more or less than the leaving of all gods out of our ontology. It doesn't entail anything about the rest of our ontology. Atheism is perfectly consistent with mental dualism, with intrinsic values, and so forth. (Perhaps you are confusing it with a very stark materialism.) My own view is a sort of physicalism -- there are no fundamentally non-physical substances -- but this allows for other properties, including mental and moral properties, to supervene on physical ones.

My initial point was that "Nothing has value indep...

2006-01-19T15:09:00.000-05:00

My initial point was that "Nothing has value independent of desire" is a very scary statement. It's not covertly or obscurely scary; it's blatantly scary; it has direct (and frightening) implications. And it's not scary merely because of its grandiose counter-intuitiveness; it's scary because it is a mindset that could easily, directly result in very large-scale evils (a few past examples come to mind). That was my initial point.

My point now is that Alonzo has given no reason for asserting it (that is, for believing it to be true) other than to say that it is "useful," which is a poor reason for believing something to be true.

Genius, "Nothing has value independent of desire" doesn't seem to be a statement of practical theory. It appears more like a statement presented as being true, although if Alonzo didn't mean it as being true then he can clarify. Also, on theism, we aren't valuable because God values us; God values us because we are valuable (and He created us as such). Our value isn't relational; it's ontological. It's God-given, not God-perceived. God doesn't perceive us as valuable and thus we are given value; rather, He gives us value and thus He perceives us as valuable (because we are).

also most actions have semi hidden negitive side e...

2006-01-19T13:46:00.000-05:00

also most actions have semi hidden negitive side effects - like the oldentropy cheating machines that fail because entropy is hidden somwhere. (like the little machine that opens a switch to let particles through that seems to defy entropy - but entropy is hidden in its brain)

If I lie to someone I generally hurt myself by reducing the truth of what I say and by making myself better at lying to myself etc. If I rape someone I cause some harm now but maybe more harm later I that person goes on to rape someone else (or whatever).

This may leaves us rightfully scared of a hypothetical because our intuitions are taking into acount obscured likely outcomes.