tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post112865270303740102..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Counterfactuals and IntuitionsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1129036555913860592005-10-11T09:15:00.000-04:002005-10-11T09:15:00.000-04:00(3') works (makes the Gettier argument valid), but...(3') works (makes the Gettier argument valid), but it requires an S5 modal logic. <BR/><BR/>It's a little weird to think that the inference involved in the Gettier counterexample requires such a strong modal logic. Then again, it's pretty weird to think it involves a contingent judgment.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1128674218355027422005-10-07T04:36:00.000-04:002005-10-07T04:36:00.000-04:00Oh yeah, good point. I think I'd have to say that ...Oh yeah, good point. I think I'd have to say that what we'd consider 'normal' conditions is likewise contingent. But I ended up appealing to unanchored counterfactuals, rather than counterfactuals anchored at the 'normal' world, which explains the different results.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1128663918999767922005-10-07T01:45:00.000-04:002005-10-07T01:45:00.000-04:00Yeah, that's another way to go. Richard Heck sugg...Yeah, that's another way to go. Richard Heck suggested something similar in the question time for his talk at Brown; naturally, I pressed him on truth in fiction. We'd have to look at the modal logic more closely to make sure that it would work, and capture the intuitions.<BR/><BR/>By the way, the collective belief version of Lewis's truth in fiction theory ("Analysis 2") *will* make truth in fiction contingent the way Williamson thinks it is -- it's a contingent fact what most people tend to believe.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com