Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Counterfactuals and Intuitions

(3') works (makes the Gettier argument valid), but...

2005-10-11T09:15:55.913-04:00

(3') works (makes the Gettier argument valid), but it requires an S5 modal logic.

It's a little weird to think that the inference involved in the Gettier counterexample requires such a strong modal logic. Then again, it's pretty weird to think it involves a contingent judgment.

Oh yeah, good point. I think I'd have to say that ...

2005-10-07T04:36:58.356-04:00

Oh yeah, good point. I think I'd have to say that what we'd consider 'normal' conditions is likewise contingent. But I ended up appealing to unanchored counterfactuals, rather than counterfactuals anchored at the 'normal' world, which explains the different results.

Yeah, that's another way to go. Richard Heck sugg...

2005-10-07T01:45:19.000-04:00

Yeah, that's another way to go. Richard Heck suggested something similar in the question time for his talk at Brown; naturally, I pressed him on truth in fiction. We'd have to look at the modal logic more closely to make sure that it would work, and capture the intuitions.

By the way, the collective belief version of Lewis's truth in fiction theory ("Analysis 2") *will* make truth in fiction contingent the way Williamson thinks it is -- it's a contingent fact what most people tend to believe.