tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post112631256577649210..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Attacks and ArgumentsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger53125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1127757339948990302005-09-26T13:55:00.000-04:002005-09-26T13:55:00.000-04:00``. . . there is an exemplary anecdote recorded by...``. . . there is an exemplary anecdote recorded by Sanctorius and repeated by Galileo: an Aristotelian is present at a dissection which shows by ocular demonstration that nerves originate in the brain and not in the heart (as Aristotle had claimed); he then confesses to the anatomist that he had made him see the matter so palpably and plainly that if Aristotle's text were not contrary to his ocular demonstration, and did not state so clearly that nerves originate in the heart, he would be forced to admit that what he had seen was true.''<BR/><BR/>Ian MacLean: <I>Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance:<BR/>The Case of Learned Medicine.</I> Cambridge University Press, 2002,<BR/>p. 192.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126704239098125612005-09-14T09:23:00.000-04:002005-09-14T09:23:00.000-04:00Richard -- 1. Sincerely, how does one assess the t...Richard -- <BR/><BR/>1. Sincerely, how does one assess the truth value of a statement of the form "some action ought to be done"? I cannot see how such a statement could be called propositional. What is the test one would undertake (even in principle), whose answer is either True of False, which would provide one with the assessment? <BR/><BR/><BR/>2. It is clear that we disagree about what the conclusion of an argument can be. I allow non-propositional utterances, which you don't. This strikes me as yet another compelling reason against your model of an argument. (I also allow non-propositional utterances elsewhere in an argument, and other forms of argument. These positions put me in the majority of people in the world, even if not in the majority of philosophers.)<BR/><BR/><BR/>3. Regarding your statement about the Ngurrara painting as evidence rather than as argument: The novelty of the Native Title Tribunal ruling in the Ngurrara case (and why it was widely reported in the press) was that the painting itself was accepted as the basis for the community's claim to proceed to the next stage of the legal process, not some written or verbal argument based on the existence of the painting. I think that makes the painting itself an argument. <BR/><BR/>Of course, one could later construe the Tribunal activities in the form of a propositional structure, as you did above. Putting aside the question as to whether the Tribunal were construing their actions this way, or even whether they thought they were, my criticism is not eliminated by such a reconstruction. <BR/><BR/>For, if one believed that the painting was evidence for a propositional argument, what is the nature of that evidence? A painting is clearly not a free-floating propositional structure, so we would have (in your reconstrual) an argument whose conclusion is a proposition and whose body (the evidence) is a painting. The problem with the propositional paradigm for arguments just moves one step back; it does not go away. Similarly, with any further reconstrual. <BR/><BR/><BR/>4. If one tries to stand outside this debate between your good self and Cole (on the one side) and myself (on the other) one may perhaps see a Kuhnian conflict of paradigms:<BR/><BR/>(a) You (or rather, Cole) asserted a particular paradigm model for an argument.<BR/><BR/>(b) I attempted to demonstrate what I believe is an inadequacy of this paradigm by presenting an example of argument (the Ngurrara painting) which was not in the form permitted by the paradigm (propositional structure). (I also presented another example against, but ignore that for now.)<BR/><BR/>(c) You interpreted the Ngurrara example in a way which fits the propositional paradigm (ie, as evidence for a propositional argument). This is perhaps the classic move by a defender of a contested paradigm. (That sentence is not intended as a criticism, since you could have just ignored my example.)<BR/><BR/>(d) I've attempted (Point 3 of this comment) to show that this intepretation does not resolve the inadequacy I believe exists with the paradigm.<BR/><BR/>(e) You may well respond to my attempt in Point 3, with a further defence of the paradigm. And so on.<BR/><BR/><BR/>Looking at our debate from this external position, I conclude that resolution between us is not possible (as you indeed suggested above). I don't think this is because we are using one word with different meanings -- such a conflict would potentially be resolvable by adoption of a shared dictionary -- but because we have adopted different paradigmatic models of an argument. <BR/><BR/>Resolution is only possible if exactly one side adopts the other's paradigm, or if some uber-paradigm can be found which incorporates both paradigms as special cases. Since you don't accept non-propositional entities as components of arguments, I can't imagine such a uber-paradigm would be acceptable to you (since it would mean accepting examples such as the Ngurrara painting as arguments). I conclude that resolution is not possible.<BR/><BR/><BR/>5. This debate has strengthened significantly my conviction that mainstream philosophy has a paradigmatic model of argument which is both seriously inadequate for real-world reasoning and which does not incorporate current thinking in the philosophy of argumentation.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126684620978209942005-09-14T03:57:00.000-04:002005-09-14T03:57:00.000-04:00"how could anyone ever make an argument in favour ..."<I>how could anyone ever make an argument in favour (or against) doing some action?</I>"<BR/><BR/>I told you already! We can make arguments for the conclusion that <B>some action ought to be done</B>. The thing in bold is a proposition of normative fact. This is how practical arguments work. We present reasons or evidence for thinking that something ought or ought not to be done. THIS is what's been going on for the past three years concerning Iraq. You can't have evidence for an imperative, by contrast. That's just nonsensical.<BR/><BR/>It might be true that the U.S. ought not to have invaded Iraq. It cannot be true that "Don't invade!"Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126682208601312872005-09-14T03:16:00.000-04:002005-09-14T03:16:00.000-04:00Richard --I'm contesting Cole's definition of argu...Richard --<BR/><BR/>I'm contesting Cole's definition of arguments as free-floating propositional structures. You can't simply say in response to my challenge that arguments are this way because the word "argument" only refers to propositions. (In the trade, that's called a circular argument, another one of the styles of reasoning traditionally called a fallacy. Because truth is preserved across the inference step there is nothing fallacious about circular arguments in general.)<BR/><BR/>On practical reasoning, of course an imperative can be the conclusion of an argument, as I said in an earlier comment. If not, then how could anyone ever make an argument in favour (or against) doing some action? We hear and make these arguments all the time in everyday life -- just take the last 3 years of public discourse on Iraq as an example. <BR/><BR/>Perhaps what you are really saying is that in the model currently adopted WITHIN MAINSTREAM PHILOSOPHY arguments can only have propositions as their conclusions. If so, this just supports my criticism made above (in my post mentioning Frege), that philosophers have been seduced by one model (a model with propositions), had have ignored other types of utterances. <BR/><BR/>You asked for philosophers of argumentation: have a look at Doug Walton's books on practical reasoning, or the work of Katie Atkinson on modeling practical reasoning with values.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126671606842453092005-09-14T00:20:00.000-04:002005-09-14T00:20:00.000-04:00just browsing (link from brian leiter's blog)two t...just browsing (link from brian leiter's blog)<BR/>two thoughts<BR/><BR/>1. "study hard!" could be an ought imperative, which has assertive value, it depends on context.<BR/><BR/>2. i always thought that ad hominem could be inductively valid and therefore sometimes not fallacious - ie in a court room <BR/>(as pointed out)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126670104845219482005-09-13T23:55:00.000-04:002005-09-13T23:55:00.000-04:00Kofi,(a) It isn't clear to me how the painting con...Kofi,<BR/><BR/>(a) It isn't clear to me how the painting constituted an argument. It sounds more like <I>evidence</I> (e.g. perhaps the lawyers would say, "This painting demonstrates the ties that the Ngurrara had to various geographic features," etc.). <BR/><BR/>(b) Practical reason concerns normative facts. I can present an argument for the conclusion that <I>you ought to study hard</I>. But the mere imperative "study hard!" cannot be the conclusion of an argument. If it has no truth value, then there can be no evidence or justification for it, so it cannot figure in an argument. (Can you cite any "philosophers of argumentation" who disagree with this?)<BR/><BR/>That arguments are propositional is true by definition. That's just part of what the word "argument" <I>means</I>. If you deny this, you are simply speaking a different language from me. As such, I doubt this disagreement will prove productive.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126636796275738642005-09-13T14:39:00.000-04:002005-09-13T14:39:00.000-04:00Cole,It's true that one can have temporary suspens...Cole,<BR/><BR/>It's true that one can have temporary suspensions of rational discussion; the question, I suppose, would be whether such temporary suspensions aren't just what is most usefully meant by the term 'fallacy'. After all, one could argue that every fallacy of irrelevance is a temporary suspension of rational discussion. If I'm right, for instance, a case of ad hominem doesn't have to be put forward as an argument; it just has to be fulfilling a role in the discussion that needs to be filled by an argument. And this, I think, follows fairly easily from thinking of ad hominem as a particular kind of irrelevance in reasoning; and irrelevance in reasoning need not always take the form of an argument itself. Thus, the "wild ideas" example could be ad hominem, assuming that it isn't just the conclusion of a prior argument.<BR/><BR/>(One of the difficulties of pinning down a fallacy of irrelevance like this one is that it is very context-sensitive; in some types of rational discussion insult might be just the idiom in which the argument is expressed, in which case it wouldn't be any more fallacious than making one's syllogisms rhyme. So it depends on what sort of discussion is going on, which is one reason why I think reasonable people can disagree. The "Mr. X" could be a completely rational argument in some contexts; the insult, for instance, could just be part of the idiom of discussion. In that case, there wouldn't be any suspension of rational discussion at all. What wouldn't be rational is to use the labeling of Mr. X as a fool as an irrelevant substitute for argument.)<BR/><BR/>I suppose one could argue that poisoning the well isn't a real ad hominem; after all, the best classification in this sort of case will just be whatever classification that's most useful, and if it turns out that poisoning the well is better classified as something other than a fallacy, then that's the way it should be classified. It often is treated as an ad hominem fallacy, though, and I think the fallacy can be understood in a way to make it clear why poisoning the well is treated as one.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126636318307944692005-09-13T14:31:00.000-04:002005-09-13T14:31:00.000-04:00Cole --Sorry, I don't mean to be mean. It's just ...Cole --<BR/><BR/>Sorry, I don't mean to be mean. It's just how I was taught to do philosophy. Apologies if any of this causes offence. <BR/><BR/>I know "argument" is a word with many meanings. I am criticizing your use of it as overly-narrow, and ill-matched to how the word is used (a) in the real world (see posts about the law) and (b) by philosophers of argumentation (see my most recent post).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126636059957834652005-09-13T14:27:00.000-04:002005-09-13T14:27:00.000-04:00Cole, Richard -- With your limited notion of what ...Cole, Richard -- With your limited notion of what an argument is, how do you account for arguments for (or agaainst) undertaking some action? <BR/><BR/>The head of the argument is an exhortation, or a command, or a request, or a promise. None of these types of statements are propositions, since they do not have truth-values. (What could possibly be the truth value of "Study hard!" or "I promise to study hard" ?) The supporting justification (the body of the argument) may be propositional (eg, statements about the world), and/or they may be appeals to the values of the actor(s) involved. How does one assess the truth-content of an appeal to values?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126635656737738282005-09-13T14:20:00.000-04:002005-09-13T14:20:00.000-04:00There's a big difference between arguments in phil...There's a big difference between arguments in philosophy and arguments in a courtroom. It's a word with many meanings.<BR/><BR/>Also, you're being mean for no reason.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126634001747527842005-09-13T13:53:00.000-04:002005-09-13T13:53:00.000-04:00Cole, Richard -- methinks you are confusing the ...Cole, Richard -- methinks you are confusing the map with the territory.<BR/><BR/>Arguments are only ever "free-floating propositional structures"? What a quaint, reductionist notion! How old-fashioned! Funny how contemporary western philosophers have so much trouble accepting as arguments anything other than propositional structures. <BR/><BR/>Not everyone is so culture-bound. In 2003, the Australian Native Title Tribunal was presented with a painting prepared by the Ngurrara people of the Great Sandy Desert of Western Australia as the argument in a hearing preliminary to a court case over traditional land rights claims. The fact that the community were able to make this painting (which represented pictorially their traditional relationships to various geographical features in the region) was presented as their case for their claim to the land. Although in no sense of the term "a propositional structure", this looks, sounds and quacks like an argument to me. The Native Title Tribunal agreed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126621667563883422005-09-13T10:27:00.000-04:002005-09-13T10:27:00.000-04:00Brandon: Also, you can have temporary suspensions ...Brandon: Also, you can have temporary suspensions of rational discourse without a complete breaking-off thereof. For example:<BR/><BR/>"Some fools never learn. Recently Mr. X, a fool if there ever was one, argued that since p, it follows that q. Apparently this is what passes for thought in the land of fools. Of course, there's an obvious objection, that p is ambiguous between p', which is obviously true but doesn't entail q, and p'', which does entail q but is obviously false. This point has been made countless times and Mr. X has had plenty of time to address it, but alas! he's more interested in impressing his fellow fools than in the truth."<BR/><BR/>Notice how a legitimate criticism of an argument is contained within all the invective. It can be isolated, formalized, and evaluated. So rational discourse is still going on. It's just heavily decorated.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126621211825864882005-09-13T10:20:00.000-04:002005-09-13T10:20:00.000-04:00I didn't even think poisoning the well was a falla...I didn't even think poisoning the well was a fallacy (i.e., fallacious argument-kind) just much as a nasty way to do business. Suppose I conclude my portion of the debate by saying, "So I'll wrap it up and hand it over to my opponent, who can amuse you with his wild ideas". Have I given an argument? Obviously not, I'd think. Hence I haven't given a fallacious argument.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126620605538232762005-09-13T10:10:00.000-04:002005-09-13T10:10:00.000-04:00Cole said,"That doesn't follow. An ad hominem fall...Cole said,<BR/><BR/>"That doesn't follow. An ad hominem fallacy (at least typically) must be an argument from X's personal characteristics to some conclusion on the argument X has presented."<BR/><BR/>As this stands, this can't be quite right; if it were true, then poisoning the well, which is certainly a typical case of ad hominem, would never be fallacious -- it's pre-emptive by definition, whereas your formulation requires that ad hominem always be reactive.<BR/><BR/>I think I understand, though, your point about how expression of an insult where an argument is needed might not itself be put forward as an argument -- it might be a complete breaking-off of rational discussion. That's fair enough. But supposing a stable context of rational discussion, I can't think of a counterexample to the claim that an insult is a commission of ad hominem when (1) it is put forward where an argument is needed and (2) is not such an argument.<BR/><BR/>One thing that seems relevant to this discussion is the principle of charity; since relevance and irrelevance can be slippery, charity would seem to require that we presume people not to have committed the fallacy except in cases where it's fairly obvious that they have.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126619944898866032005-09-13T09:59:00.000-04:002005-09-13T09:59:00.000-04:00Also, as an example of the testimony / argument po...Also, as an example of the testimony / argument point Richard made: Suppose I see a trail of cake crumbs leading to a cake-lover I know to be unscrupulous with icing smeared all over his face, nervously saying, "I did not eat the missing cake!" The circumstantial evidence makes it reasonable to conclude that what he says is false. But I'm not evaluating any <I>argument</I> he has presented. If he had cited a number of facts and tried to show how they strongly support the conclusion that he didn't eat the missing cake, then there'd be an argument to evaluate. But then the circumstantial evidence would be irrelevant to the strength of the argument.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126619442356832092005-09-13T09:50:00.000-04:002005-09-13T09:50:00.000-04:00Actually Richard, there has been literature descri...Actually Richard, there has been literature describing "visual arguments." While I'm skeptical about the existence of such a thing, it begins with the premise that language and propositions facilitate reasoning, but are not a sine qua non for it. <BR/><BR/>Antonio Damasio, the famous neurologist has done studies which suggest reasoning to be linked to the capacity for emotion and cognition located in the right pre-frontal cortex rather than language centers of the brain. Still, it's an open question whether reasoning itself can externally manifest in a medium other than propositions. His finding is that you cannot reason without emotion.<BR/><BR/>As for dispensing with "trust" and relying on the force of the better argument, this is the really contentious thing. A "good argument" cannot "force" you to accept anything precisely because the persuasiveness of an argument is independent of its validity (and sometimes its soundness depending on whether you have a pragmatic definition of truth i.e. the argument is true because it works in persuading).<BR/><BR/>Getting back to your claim about the independence of an argument from "character" evaluations and testimony. We often poo poo arguments that appeal to emotions rather than reason, and the question is whether this dichotomy is false, i.e. the argument that reaches a conclusion that makes me "feel better" is the better argument.<BR/><BR/>Ad Hominem arguments work because they appeal to often tacit dislike of the person you are arguing against. You are attempting to persuade your reader by invoking similar sentiments and this is where the "force" of the argument lies. Is the Ad Hominem argument fallacious? Yes! Is it irrational? Not necessarily, it depends on your concept of reason!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126619258479876442005-09-13T09:47:00.000-04:002005-09-13T09:47:00.000-04:00Kofi: The way "proposition" is typically used in c...Kofi: The way "proposition" is typically used in contemporary philosophy, it <I>isn't</I> a type of locution alongside commands, requests, promises, etc. A proposition is something like an abstract bearer of semantic value (content, truth-value, etc.) Perhaps the locution-type you were thinking of is <I>assertion</I>?<BR/><BR/>In any case, an argument can be represented by a diagram, by a series of Latin characters, by a series of Cyrillic characters, by an utterance, by a series of hand signals, etc. But the argument itself (the thing being represented) is a free-floating propositional structure.<BR/><BR/>Hope this helps.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126610414817034262005-09-13T07:20:00.000-04:002005-09-13T07:20:00.000-04:00If you exhort me to "Study hard!", where's the arg...If you exhort me to "Study hard!", where's the argument? "Non-propositional argument" is an oxymoron.<BR/><BR/>Also, we should distinguish between arguments and testimony. In testimony (e.g. witnesses in court), we are asked to believe something merely because the person is asserting it. In such cases, their character and reliability is obviously of central importance and relevance. Not so for arguments. There the authority is external -- I ask that you believe my conclusion, not because <I>I</I> say it, but because <I>rationality</I> compels you (given that the premises are undisputed, etc.).<BR/><BR/>If a premise P is disputed, then I might present a sub-argument which establishes P as its conclusion. And so forth. At no stage do I ask you to "trust me". That's entirely unnecessary. A good argument will force you to accept the conclusion on the basis of premises (or sub-premises) you already accept. No testimony required. Hence my character is strictly irrelevant, and <I>ad hominems</I> would be genuinely fallacious and irrational.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126609250393239732005-09-13T07:00:00.000-04:002005-09-13T07:00:00.000-04:00Cole writes:"I'll also add, re the example from Co...Cole writes:<BR/><BR/><I>"I'll also add, re the example from Cohen, that there is a distinction between (i) an argument, and (ii) a presentation of an argument. One is a free-floating propositional structure, evaluable for validity and soundness and the like. The other is a social act, evaluable for appropriateness and courtesy and the like."</I><BR/><BR/>Your second sentences does not follow from your first, because (a) "a free-floating propositional structure" is a REPRESENTATION of an argument, not necessarily the argument itself. We could represent arguments by other means (eg, by diagrams); and because (b) Insofar as it is a representation of an argument, a propositional structure only represents a PROPOSITIONAL argument. <BR/><BR/>Since Frege and Wittgenstein focused everyone's <BR/>attention on propositions, we've forgotten that there are lots of other locutions (eg, commands, requests, promises, etc), which can be used in arguments. If I exhort you to "Study hard!", where's the proposition? <BR/><BR/>Finally, your structure assumes the content and the presentation of an argument are independent of one another. If they are not, as when a witness in court tells us what he saw on some past occasion at which we were not present, then it behooves us to assess the presentation in order to make a rational assessment of the content. To do otherwise, is irrational.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126590690643945772005-09-13T01:51:00.000-04:002005-09-13T01:51:00.000-04:00Yeah, in the sense of "warranted insult" I was wor...Yeah, in the sense of "warranted insult" I was working with, I doubt saying "you're fat" is warranted just in case the target is indeed fat. I meant a <I>morally</I> warranted insult, the kind of insult that's worth making, or that the person to deserves to have directed their way.<BR/><BR/>Some milquetoasts might think that insults are never morally warranted, but I took it that everyone in this conversation agreed that insults are morally warranted at least <I>sometimes</I>.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126587644943865462005-09-13T01:00:00.000-04:002005-09-13T01:00:00.000-04:00Two minor points. Contrary to what you suggest, f...Two minor points. Contrary to what you suggest, functional, it would seem to follow that an insult is warranted if it is neither fallacious nor unwarranted. I would have thought the warranted ones just were the ones that were not unwarranted or, which comes to the same thing, not without warrant.<BR/><BR/>I think I see what you were getting at, though. It seems that there is a difference between an epistemic warrant and a moral one. Perhaps the epistemic warrant is necessary for the moral one but not sufficient as the above examples seem to establish.<BR/><BR/>It is a mistake, however, to think of an insult as an instance of an ad hominem since insults are not arguments. Elements of arguments might be insulting. The offering of an argument might be a clever way of insulting someone but 'You're a pinko' does not make for an argument. It does that only once set along side further elements in reasoning towards some conclusion.Clayton Littlejohnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05596200828134402805noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126572551272802192005-09-12T20:49:00.000-04:002005-09-12T20:49:00.000-04:00Sorry, functional, we posted at the same time. And...Sorry, functional, we posted at the same time. And making the same point.<BR/><BR/>But I'm not sure if I want to agree that questions of warranted insult are the kind that we can't expect others to share. Just I expect people to share my basic views on torture and rape (so much so that I will condemn them for disagreeing), there might be some insults for which I expect others to share my view that they are warranted to or unwarranted (so much so that I will condemn them for disagreeing).<BR/><BR/>For example, I expect people to share my view that calling a stranger monstrously fat is unwarranted, no matter how true or how artfully presented. If they don't share my view, I will condemn them as callous bastards. Are you not with me on this?<BR/><BR/>(And whether moral questions are subjective or non-rational seems to me beside the point. I think my opposition to torture and rape to be completely non-rational, and that there aren't any wrongness facts out in the world, ready to be described. Nevertheless, if you don't share my opposition to torture and rape, I will condemn you without a second's thought)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126572126602028102005-09-12T20:42:00.000-04:002005-09-12T20:42:00.000-04:00Sorry to post yet again, but I like this example:S...Sorry to post yet again, but I like this example:<BR/><BR/>Suppose I notice how ugly you are and I present to you the following argument (assume you've done nothing to deserve this):<BR/><BR/>1. You are extremely ugly.<BR/>2. For any given extremely ugly person x, odds are, hardly anyone is willing to have sex with x.<BR/>3. Therefore, odds are, hardly anyone is willing to have sex with you.<BR/><BR/>The argument itself might be unimpeachable. But the fact that I presented it to you makes me a rotten bastard. I am definitely worthy of contempt, and perhaps worthy of being spat on.<BR/><BR/>Moral: Just because an argument is unimpeachable doesn't make it OK to present the argument to others.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126572009731602522005-09-12T20:40:00.000-04:002005-09-12T20:40:00.000-04:00So there are (i) warranted insults, (ii) unwarrant...<I>So there are (i) warranted insults, (ii) unwarranted insults, and (iii) insults that instance the ad hominem fallacy.</I><BR/><BR/>All trivially true (although not recognized often enough). <BR/><BR/>But what of it? Are we to conclude that category i can be used without hesitation simply because it is neither a fallacy nor unwarranted? <BR/><BR/>No. It might be true, for example, that the women I brush against in the street is fatter than a rhinoceros, but that does not make it polite or useful to point out that fact. Or more to the point here, the line between categories i and ii (warranted and unwarranted) is not at all clear. This is because whether an insult is warranted or unwarranted depends on judgments that are extraordinarily subjective, personal, tied up with moral premises that one cannot rationally expect others to share. In practice, this means that when I think an insult is warranted, other people may with perfect plausibility and rationality think it unwarranted. <BR/><BR/>All of which is to say, a wise and thoughtful person will not conduct himself by letting fly with insults at every possible opportunity.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1126570650611829432005-09-12T20:17:00.000-04:002005-09-12T20:17:00.000-04:00I'll also add, re the example from Cohen, that the...I'll also add, re the example from Cohen, that there is a distinction between (i) an argument, and (ii) a presentation of an argument. One is a free-floating propositional structure, evaluable for validity and soundness and the like. The other is a social act, evaluable for appropriateness and courtesy and the like.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com