I've answered in a new post. (I'll add that I'd be...

2005-08-12T06:54:30.050-04:00

I've answered in a new post. (I'll add that I'd be happy if it turned out that zombies were conceptually impossible. But, unfortunately, they do at least seem prima facie conceivable.)

On what basis do you make your judgement of the no...

2005-08-12T03:20:23.806-04:00

On what basis do you make your judgement of the nomological impossibility of zombies that are physical duplicates of thinking beings?

Surely you haven't done any emperical testing involving either zombies or exact physical duplicates. Nor, presumably, do you have the hypothetical 'complete neuroscience' with which you're able to show the nomological connection between certain physical states and certain conscious states.

If the answer essentially involves an appeal to conceptual criteria, then how can it be maintainted that such duplication is conceptually possible?

Perhaps the answer lies in an appeal to certain epistemic or methodological norms which do the extra weeding out.

Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Conceivability, Possibility, and Explanation

I've answered in a new post. (I'll add that I'd be...

On what basis do you make your judgement of the no...