tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post110368869127694822..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Ontological CommitmentRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger15125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1104073968914344602004-12-26T10:12:00.000-05:002004-12-26T10:12:00.000-05:00Richard, I still think you're right, and can't thi...Richard, I still think you're right, and can't think of any other passage in Quine that would change that. The circularity that BV criticizes is not only not a problem given Quine's project, but is required by the project. The very point is that I assume something exists if there is something in (or applied by) my statements that is identical to that thing.BV's critizing this point would only make sense if he thought it a bad reason for assuming that people are, by referring to things in certain ways, committed to their existence. This is a common criticism of Quine's ontological commitment. When he criticizes it for being a circular point about existence, it's not clear he understands the point at all.<br /><br />Now Mach's criticism of Russell's theory of reference, in which any statement can be paraphrased by replacing names with descriptions, as being ontological is just odd. Russell may be claiming that things are just collections of describable features, though I am not really sure what this would entail. However, all Quine is saying is that I am not committed to the existence of something (e.g., Pegasus) if I can paraphrase my statement in such a way that its existence is not assumed. Since I can replace "Pegasus" with a description that involves the nonexistence, or at the very least, does not involve the existence of Pegasus, then I am not committed to Pegasus' existence. It's amazing that BV used this sort of example in his post without giving Quine's solution.<br /><br />It might also note that in the paper to which BV refers, Quine does offer an ontological position (no universals, no fictional entities, and, in his view, mathematical entities (which seem to be one of the main reasons for coming up with the theory of ontological commitment), etc. BV could have criticized what Quine does say about what exists (and perhaps elsewhere he does), but instead, he criticizes what Quine says about what our statements imply we are committed to, ontologically. That is baffling to me, and nothing in his post justifies it. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fmixingmemory.blogspot.com" TITLE="mixingmemory at gmail dot com">Chris</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103973702290533252004-12-25T06:21:00.000-05:002004-12-25T06:21:00.000-05:00Brandon, I think you're probably right, but since ...Brandon, I think you're probably right, but since Macht brought up the Pegasus paraphrase I wanted to sort that issue out too.<br /><br />To explain the original post: I understood BV as complaining that Quine's explication of existence was circular. But that would only be a problem if the explication's purpose was to provide an analysis of existence (i.e. in terms of something else). I don't think that was Quine's purpose here - or at least not his only purpose. Rather, I thought Quine's explication of existence was intended to clarify ontological commitments, not existence itself. In other words, it seemed to me that BV was criticising Quine for doing badly something that Quine hadn't attempted in the first place.<br /><br />I should note that it's very possible that BV's criticism is based on further claims Quine makes elsewhere, of which I am unaware. But I had wanted to post about ontological commitment anyway, so (even if my counter-criticism turns out to be misplaced) BV's post served as a convenient starting point. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A>RichardAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103935783540200722004-12-24T19:49:00.000-05:002004-12-24T19:49:00.000-05:00I'm a little puzzled (I'm way out of my field, so ...I'm a little puzzled (I'm way out of my field, so that's perhaps not surprising); I see nothing in BV's post that assumes Quine has a particular ontology at all. I took him to be summarizing an argument against the view that existence is what the existential quantifier expresses. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fbranemrys.blogspot.com" TITLE="branem2 at branemrys dot org">Brandon</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103831152195153892004-12-23T14:45:00.000-05:002004-12-23T14:45:00.000-05:00A number of years ago I was having an agrument wit...A number of years ago I was having an agrument with a young man about the nature of reality. I finally got so frustrated with his vacuously worded nonsense about unreal nature of the real that I slapped him REAL hard with my REAL hand on his REAL face. Unfortunately, it caused REAL blood to flow and he got REAL mad. We then got into a REAL fight, were placed under REAL arrest and after posting REAL bond were released until a REAL court date was set. The REAL judge then fined my REAL ass, but the assult charge was dropped so I guess THAT wasn't REAL!<br /><br />I'm probably not as smart as the rest of you guys, but all I know is that try as I might, after reading the post and comments, I'm REALLY confused. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fpixnaps.blogspot.com%2F2004%2F12%2Fontological-commitment.html%23comments" TITLE="olduvai at nycap dot rr dot com">William G</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103776834130329002004-12-22T23:40:00.000-05:002004-12-22T23:40:00.000-05:00Fortunately, reality exists whether we are ontolog...Fortunately, reality exists whether we are ontologically committed to it or not.<br /><br />The idea that by saying "Pegasus doesn't exist" we imply that "Pegasus exists" because otherwise we couldn't use the word is just stupid. It's boringly stupid, because our definitions of objects are so pathetic. Humans name stuff, and not even hardcore logicians claim anymore than there is any kind of sensible way by which we do so. "You can never step into the same river twice" but as a human, the Yarra River is still the Yarra River. It's a mess of naming conventions.<br /><br />Saying "Pegasus doesn't exist" is nothing sure than a human-rational shorthand for asserting the nonexistence of anything with the set of fuzzy properties associated with the mythical beast pegasus. Okay, you can assert that pegasus has meaning only because of the existence of the myth, and thus "pegasus" in some sense exists, it's not the same meaning as implied by the sentence "pegasus does not exist". Quine's paradox only exists because his language is too fuzzy to distinguish between myth-pegasus and the claim that there is no living beast with the same properties as myth-pegasus.<br /><br />All you have to do is reject that the description of pegasus in insufficient for the logical task, then realise that ontological objects are inherently fuzzy, never conforming to a logic including an excluded middle, and then all of a sudden you realise it's easy to explain why these people are just talking rubbish.<br /><br />-T <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?melbournephilosophy.com" TITLE="tennessee at tennessee dot id dot au">Tennessee Leeuwenburg</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103762248882699052004-12-22T19:37:00.000-05:002004-12-22T19:37:00.000-05:00Richard, great quote in the update. I just don't s...Richard, great quote in the update. I just don't see what Quine is committed to, ontologically (sorry for the pun). <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fmixingmemory.blogspot.com" TITLE="mixingmemory at gmail dot com">Chris</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103759349500531072004-12-22T18:49:00.000-05:002004-12-22T18:49:00.000-05:00I don't mean to be a nuisance but from the small a...I don't mean to be a nuisance but from the small amount of reading I've done over the past day, Quine <B>did</B> take that extra step. Of course, we don't <I>have</I> to take it, but the fact remains that Quine did. And since the point of BV's blog post was to explain that he wasn't Quinean, I just don't see the problem. I still think that you guys are the ones who are missing BV's point.<br /><br />I very may be wrong, though, when I said this: "If you accept Quine's ideas about ontological commitment, then you also have to accept yada, yada, yada." <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fprosthesis.blogspot.com" TITLE="">Macht</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103757225306676852004-12-22T18:13:00.000-05:002004-12-22T18:13:00.000-05:00That pegasus translation was merely an example, to...That pegasus translation was merely an example, to show why using the (apparent) name 'Pegasus' doesn't <I>necessarily</I> commit us to an existing named entity. We don't <I>have</I> to make the translation I suggest. The point is simply that we have the <I>option</I>, if we don't want to admit that Pegasus exists. But we could just as well say "there is something that is Pegasus", which would uncontrovertibly commit us to Pegasus' existence.<br /><br />So I just don't think it's true that "If you accept Quine's ideas about ontological commitment, then you also have to accept yada, yada, yada."<br /><br />The framework he provides is a neutral one; it can tell us what the ontological commitments of a theory are. But it can't tell us which theory to choose. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A>RichardAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103750373312394932004-12-22T16:19:00.000-05:002004-12-22T16:19:00.000-05:00When Quine/Richard makes the leap from "Pegasus ex...When Quine/Richard makes the leap from "Pegasus exists" to "having the attribute of being Pegasus" he is saying something about what "existence itself" is. (I don't know whether this is a good leap or a bad leap, it might not be a leap at all, but it is saying something about what existence is.) The way I read it, what BV was saying in the second part of his post was that Quine's primary linguist/psychological point relies "logically prior" idea of what existence actually is or "What is it for an item to be there?" <br /><br />Remember, the whole point of his blog entry was to say why he wasn't a Quinean. The point of him criticizing it seems to be something along the lines of "If you accept Quine's ideas about ontological commitment, then you also have to accept yada, yada, yada. I don't find yada, yada, yada acceptable, so I won't accept Quine's ideas about ontological commitment."<br /><br />So, I guess, while you are complaining that he is missing Quine's point, I'm complaining that you are missing his point.<br /><br />Of course, I could be totally misreading BV. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fprosthesis.blogspot.com" TITLE="">Macht</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103745077343305642004-12-22T14:51:00.000-05:002004-12-22T14:51:00.000-05:00Words words words !!
empty cleverness about nothin...Words words words !!<br />empty cleverness about nothing. Would it be very provocative to suggest that there is a 'real existence' and that words are not it? Of course i would need to use words to try and prove that ... so.... <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?blah" TITLE="muddle at orcon dot net dot nz">david </A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103734496988793752004-12-22T11:54:00.000-05:002004-12-22T11:54:00.000-05:00Because you could have any ontology and still inst...Because you could have any ontology and still instantiate his view of ontological commitment, I can't really see Quine saying anything about the nature of existence. And even if he is, the passage <br />BV quotes is, in its circularity, saying exactly what Quine wants it to. Anyway, if Quine really is saying something about existence, it is nothing more than that something exists if it exists, as BV himself notes, and that's hardly a substantive ontology. Why would we criticize it, when Quine's primary point is linguistic/psychological? <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fmixingmemory.blogspot.com" TITLE="mixingmemory at gmail dot com">Chris</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103705614354110802004-12-22T03:53:00.000-05:002004-12-22T03:53:00.000-05:00I probably know less about Quine than all of you, ...I probably know less about Quine than all of you, but you only responded to the first part of his post. I'm not sure that BV implied anything other than what you said in your post <B>in the first part of his post</B>. He doesn't talk about ontological commitment in his post, but he does in the paper that he linked to. The second part of his post, I believe, is saying that while Quine may only be trying to say something about ontological commitment, he is in fact saying something about "existence itself." <br /><br />If Quine appeals to, instead of the name Pegasus, the attribute of "being Pegasus," this is a claim about "existence itself." The claim being that existence is the instantiation of some attribute.<br /><br />I guess I just don't see how one can talk about ontological commitment without talking about what existence actually is. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fprosthesis.blogspot.com" TITLE="">Macht</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103696024996406322004-12-22T01:13:00.000-05:002004-12-22T01:13:00.000-05:00Richard, I think you're right, MV has either compl...Richard, I think you're right, MV has either completely missed Quine's point, or is just way over my head. Quine's "theory of existence," as MV calls it, is about commitment, rather than an attempt at an ontology of what really is, out there. This makes what MV calls its circularity the very point! Another reason why I don't read his blog. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fmixingmemory.blogspot.com" TITLE="mixingmemory at gmail dot com">Chris</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103691572280640442004-12-21T23:59:00.000-05:002004-12-21T23:59:00.000-05:00Hmm, that's a little different from what I meant t...Hmm, that's a little different from what I meant to be talking about here. Though it sounds as though you might like some of my <A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fpixnaps.blogspot.com%2F2004%2F05%2Fcategory-logic-semantics.html">semantics posts</A> - especially <A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fpixnaps.blogspot.com%2F2004%2F12%2Fessential-meanings.html">Essential Meanings</A> and <A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fpixnaps.blogspot.com%2F2004%2F11%2Ftrue-contradictions.html">True Contradictions</A>. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A>RichardAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1103691175416876402004-12-21T23:52:00.000-05:002004-12-21T23:52:00.000-05:00Ian Stewarts book Flatterland, talks about an idea...Ian Stewarts book Flatterland, talks about an idea that seesm to go along with what was just said.<br /><br />I dont have the book on me so i am going to adlib the book here.<br /><br />"What is a point?" Hopper asked.<br />"It is a point." I said confussed.<br />"What is a mug of beer?"<br />"A mug of beer."<br />"Where does the mug sit?"<br />"Hopper you are make no since." I said getting anoyed with his games.<br />"It sits on a bar." Hopper said looking me in the eye. It was no game.<br />"Okay." I said.<br />"Well the mug sites on the bar, and a point sits on a line. They are two different things, but still i could just as well call the bar a line, and the mug then would be a point on it. Or i could call the earth a line, and call your house a point on it. Names are just names, not the things them selfs."<br /><br />Okay i know that that might be a weird way of looking at it. But Shakespear said some like this too. "A rose by any other name is still a rose." <br /><br />I think we can not prove relity by showing that we are equal to something we know it real. First of all. HOW IN THE WORLD DID WE MAKE IT REAL. Since we cant say we are real, i dont think we can say any idea we have is real. And to say that something is real is an idea, once again we are running in circles. <br /><br />The idea that names, or content vaiable names can be used is a bad idea. cause as i just said, names are just names, how are we spossed to know that the name we are saying is calling the right object. If you study Object Orented Programing, it is not what the objects name is the matters. It is what it holds. I think we need to look beyond names to what things are made of to prove that they are real.<br /><br />I guess with that, we can say all is real because atoms are real, and we are all made up of atoms. But once again, who made up the atom?<br /> <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?blindwise.blogspot.com" TITLE="intmathran at yahoo dot com">Chase Whittemore</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com