People sometimes complain that impartial consequentialism is "too demanding", insofar as it requires us (comparatively) wealthy and fortunate people to do a lot to help the less fortunate. And it's true that those are non-trivial costs. But it's hard to take seriously the suggestion that these costs are morally more significant than the costs endured by the less fortunate by our doing less (or nothing). So-called "moderate" views of beneficence are in fact extremely costly for the worst-off -- much worse than consequentialism is for the wealthy. So it's an odd objection.
Thursday, December 22, 2016
Is Consequentialism More Demanding?
Sunday, December 18, 2016
Illustrating the Paradox of Deontology
One who accepts a "consequentialism of rights" might hold that deliberating killing an innocent person (let's call this "murder", for short) is so morally bad that it isn't justified even to save five lives. But deontologists go further, suggesting that one should not murder even to prevent five other murders. This seems puzzling: if murder is so morally horrendous, why should we not be concerned to minimize its occurrence? This is Scheffler's paradox of deontology in a nutshell.
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